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 Current remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, such as reversal of 
conviction or dismissal of charges, are rarely granted by courts and thus do 
not deter prosecutors effectively.  Further, such all-or-nothing remedial 
schemes are often problematic from corrective and expressive perspectives, 
especially when misconduct has not affected the trial verdict.  When granted, 
such remedies produce windfalls to guilty defendants and provoke public re-
sentment, undermining their expressive value in condemning misconduct.  To 
avoid such windfalls, courts must refuse to grant any remedy at all, either re-
fusing to recognize violations or deeming them harmless.  This often leaves 
significant non-conviction-related harms unremedied and egregious prosecu-
torial misconduct uncondemned. 
This Article accordingly proposes adding sentence reduction to current 
all-or-nothing remedial schemes, arguing that this would provide courts with 
an intermediate remedy that they would be more willing to grant.  It argues 
that several prosecutorial incentives combine to make sentence reduction an 
effective deterrent.  Moreover, because sentence reduction could be tailored to 
the magnitude of the violation, it could resolve the windfall dilemma and serve 
as an effective corrective and expressive remedy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Remedies for violations of criminal defendants’ procedural rights are 
often all or nothing.  Convictions are either reversed or affirmed; charges are 
either thrown out or let stand; evidence is either excluded or admitted. These 
remedies pose serious dilemmas for courts.  When granted, strong remedies 
often result in windfalls for guilty defendants—and courts, as Judge Guido Ca-
labresi has observed, “are not in the business of letting people out on technical-
ities.”1  But if courts don’t want to grant such windfalls, they cannot grant any 
remedy at all: they must either avoid recognizing a violation in the first place 
or deem violations harmless.  The latter problem has been especially acute with 
respect to prosecutorial misconduct. As many scholars have observed, such 
misconduct is widespread, and the existing remedies are ineffective, largely 
because they are rarely invoked.2 
 This Article accordingly proposes adding to the menu of available re-
medial options an intermediate remedy for prosecutorial misconduct: reduction 
of the defendant’s sentence.  Sentence reduction is an accepted remedy in a 
number of other jurisdictions for a variety of kinds of violations of criminal 
defendants’ rights.  It has been approved, for instance, by the European Court 
of Human Rights,3 some European domestic courts,4 several Canadian provin-
cial supreme courts,5 and the Appeals Chamber for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda.6  But it is essentially unknown in U.S. courts.  The one 
time the Supreme Court considered the possibility of using sentence reduction 
                                                 
1 Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 112 (2003). 
2 See infra Part I.  
3 E.g., Chraidi v. Germany, 47 E.H.R.R. 2, paras. 24-25 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2006) (holding that 
sentence reduction is a permissible remedy for excessive pretrial detention); Scordino v. 
Italy, 45 E.H.R.R. 7, paras. 185-186 (holding that sentence reduction can adequately reme-
dy speedy trial violations); Mathew v. Netherlands, 43 E.H.R.R. 23, paras. 148-49 (2005) 
(holding that sentence reduction can compensate for unlawful conditions of detention). 
4 E.g., Salah v. Netherlands, 44 E.H.R.R. 55 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2006) (discussing cases in 
which Dutch courts reduced sentences to remedy unlawful wiretaps and prisoner mistreat-
ment); Yetsinercki v. United Kingdom, 43 E.H.R.R. 4, para. 8 (2005) (quoting a U.K. court 
that reduced sentence to remedy “anxiety” caused by trial delay).  
5 E.g., R. v. MacPherson, 100 C.C.C. (3d) 216 (N.B. 1995) (reducing sentence to remedy 
delay before arraignment); R. v. Chabot, 77 C.C.C. (3d) 371 (Queb. 1992) (reducing sen-
tence to remedy improper detention); R. v. Stannard, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 544 (Sask. 1989) (re-
ducing sentence to remedy unlawful search).  The remedy remains infrequent in Canada, in 
part because of controversy as to when Canadian sentencing law permits it. Oren Bick, 
Remedial Sentence Reduction, 51 CRIM. L.Q. 199 (2006). 
6 E.g., Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-A, Judgment, P 255 (May 23, 2005) 
(ordering sentence reduction to remedy unlawful initial detention); Semanza v. Prosecutor, 
Case No. ICTR 97-20-A, Judgment, P 325 (May 20, 2005) (same); Barayagwiza v. Prose-
cutor, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor's Request for Review or Recon-
sideration) (Mar. 31, 2000) (ordering sentence reduction to remedy unlawful delay in in-
dictment and appointment of counsel); see Sonja Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: 
Remedial Deterrence in International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 717-18 (2008). 
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to remedy a non-sentencing-related error (a Speedy Trial Clause violation), it 
rejected it, reiterating its cursory conclusion in an earlier speedy trial case that 
dismissal with prejudice was the “only possible” remedy.7    
 U.S. scholarship has likewise almost entirely ignored this possible re-
medy.  However, two pieces have proposed sentence reduction as an alternative 
to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule—a short essay by Judge Calabresi8 
and an article by Harry Caldwell and Carol Chase.9  Both would combine sen-
tence reduction with direct sanctions against the police, such as fines.  Their 
theory is that the direct sanctions would deter misconduct while sentence re-
duction would give defendants an incentive to raise misconduct claims.10  In a 
response to Calabresi’s piece, Yale Kamisar argues that this combined scheme 
would not accomplish the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.11  First, he 
observes that, as Calabresi concedes,12 sentence reduction itself will not deter 
police misconduct because the police don’t care “one whit” about sentencing.13  
Second, direct sanctions would not work—the police are politically powerful, 
and judges have historically been loath to supervise police department policies 
or to grant remedies against individual officers.14 
 Kamisar may well be right that sentence reduction would not work as 
an alternative to the exclusionary rule. His two key empirical assumptions are 
both plausible: that the police don’t care about sentencing15 and that courts will 
                                                 
7 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1973) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 
514, 532 (1972)); see infra Part V.A. 
8 Calabresi, supra. 
9 Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 
45 (1994). 
10 Calabresi, supra, at 116-17; Caldwell & Chase, supra, at 68-71 (also including an educa-
tional component). 
11 Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 119, 136 (2003). 
12 Calabresi, supra, at 116. 
13 Kamisar, supra, at 136. 
14 Id. at 127-29, 138-39. 
15 Kamisar cites no studies of police attitudes concerning sentencing, and I have found 
none.  However, Josh Bowers notes that low sentences sometimes help police effectiveness 
by reducing community resentment. The Relationship Between Plea Bargaining and Crim-
inal Code Structure, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 94-96, 102-04 (2007).   One study finds that 
increased prosecutorial screening of cases did not affect police practices—police were 
“willing to suffer a refusal to prosecute.”  Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and 
Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2059 (2006).  If police are indifferent to whether 
their cases are prosecuted at all, they probably do not care about sentences either—but this 
also suggests that the exclusionary rule itself may have limited deterrent effect.  But see 
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 
75, 83 (1992) (finding that judges, prosecutors, and public defenders believe “the exclusio-
nary rule has dramatically improved police behavior”).  In theory, even if police do not 
care about sentences, prosecutors who do care might be able to influence police behavior.  
See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and their Agents, Agents and their Prosecutors, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 779 (2003) (noting prosecutorial influence over investigations); but 
SENTENCE REDUCTION AS A REMEDY FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 3
be reluctant to directly sanction the police.16  But even if he is right on both 
counts—a question beyond the scope of this paper—it would not mean sen-
tence reduction has no viable role as a criminal procedure remedy.  Even if it 
does not deter police misconduct, it might well deter prosecutorial misconduct.  
The first of Kamisar’s assumptions is probably not applicable to prosecutors, 
who can be expected to care about sentence reductions.17 
Although prosecutors’ motivations vary, political pressures, ideology, 
office policies and subcultures, career interests, and the adversarial process all 
generally tend to push them toward preferences for longer sentences.18  And 
even a prosecutor who does not usually care much about sentences would face 
professional embarrassment if a court were to reduce a sentence on the express 
basis of her wrongdoing.  To be sure, prosecutors would presumably rather 
have a sentence lowered than a conviction thrown out.  But a less serious but 
much more likely penalty might be a bigger deterrent.   
Sentence reduction is also an attractive alternative to the extent that 
criminal procedure remedies are premised on corrective justice or expressive 
rationales.  Certainly, sentence reduction would be insufficient to remedy pro-
secutorial misconduct that rendered the conviction unreliable—unless a defen-
dant has been fairly convicted, she should not be sentenced at all.  But not all 
misconduct falls into this category.  Some harms the defendant but does not 
undermine the reliability of the conviction.  For instance, undue delays in trial 
may cause extended emotional stress, even if they do not ultimately preclude a 
fair trial.  When a prosecutor makes abusive or racist comments about a defen-
dant at trial, the defendant may suffer emotional or dignitary harm.  When she 
makes inflammatory comments about the defendant’s character, the defendant 
may additionally suffer reputational harm.  Prosecutors are immune from dam-
age suits for these harms, and while remedies like reversal or dismissal are 
available in theory, courts in practice rarely grant them. 
In such cases, sentence reduction could vindicate the defendant’s rights 
in a nontrivial way, providing a remedy that matters to the defendant and has 
                                                                                                                            
see id. at 755, 758, 767-68 (observing that prosecutors’ relationship with police involves 
mutual dependence, not hierarchical control).   
16 Kamisar cites the experience of a direct sanction system for INS officers who conduct 
unlawful searches; these sanctions were almost never invoked.  Kamisar, supra, at 138-39; 
see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1054 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).  He also 
cites evidence of the political power of police departments, including the fact that “many 
other ‘direct sanctions’ proposals . . . have failed over the years,” id. at 129, and scholar-
ship arguing that judges frequently tolerate police perjury, id. at 130.  As I show in Part I, 
courts virtually never issue direct sanctions against prosecutors.  It seems plausible that 
they would similarly abstain from sanctioning police, especially given the Supreme Court’s 
recent suggestion that police departments can be trusted to handle discipline for Fourth 
Amendment violations internally.  See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598-99 (2006). 
17 Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 
TEX. L. REV. 629, 631 (1972) (giving reasons prosecutors care more than police do about 
appellate reversal). 
18 See infra Part III. 
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symbolic significance to the community.  But because the magnitude of the 
reduction could be tailored to the violation, it would not create a massive wind-
fall that risks offending the community’s sense of justice and undermining the 
remedy’s expressive and corrective purposes.  And because it is not such a 
windfall, courts may be more willing to invoke it—serving those purposes bet-
ter than the all-or-nothing choices that most often result in nothing. 
Part I of this Article argues that courts’ reluctance to invoke current 
remedies leaves a great deal of prosecutorial misconduct unredressed.  Part II 
outlines my sentence reduction proposal and argues that courts would be rela-
tively willing to grant such reductions. Part III examines the incentives of pros-
ecutors and explain why sentence reduction could effectively deter misconduct.   
Part IV argues that sentence reduction is an effective corrective and expressive 
remedy. Part V explores three contexts in which sentence reduction could ap-
ply: speedy trial violations, race discrimination in jury selection, and “harmless 
but serious” examples of trial misconduct or disclosure violations.  In the first 
two contexts, sentence reduction would amount to a less extreme alternative to 
the current remedies; in the third, it would be a new remedy where none is cur-
rently provided. Finally, Part VI addresses implementation details and practical 
objections. 
I. The Failure of Current Remedies for Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Prosecutorial misconduct has been a widespread and widely criticized 
problem in the U.S. criminal justice system for decades.19  “Misconduct” is a 
term with no fixed meaning, and some courts and scholars reserve it for certain 
small subcategories of very extreme wrongdoing.  I use it more broadly, how-
ever, as shorthand for any prosecutorial actions that violate the U.S. constitu-
tion or other substantial rights of defendants under federal or state law.  Exam-
ples include failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, race and sex discrimina-
tion in jury selection, inflammatory opening and closing statements, deliberate 
attempts to make sure information that is supposed to be excluded gets before 
the jury, and foot-dragging that deprives the defendant of a speedy trial.20  Each 
                                                 
19 See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182-83 (2d Cir. 1981); Michael D. Cicchi-
ni, Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 369 (2007); Peter A. 
Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shap-
ing Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 399. 399-400; Alexandra White 
Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving Prosecutor, 61 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 46 (2005); Charles L. Cantrell, Prosecutorial Misconduct: Recog-
nizing Errors in Closing Argument. 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 535, 562 (2003); Kenneth 
Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 
887, 956-57 (1998); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 833, 869 (1997); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior, 64 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 851, 890 (1995); Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Dis-
cipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965, 966 (1984); id. at 975; Alschuler, supra, at 631.   
20 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1935) (defining prosecutorial miscon-
duct as conduct “overstep[ing] the bounds of . . . propriety and fairness” and giving exam-
ples); Joy, supra, at 402-03; Rosenthal, supra, at 947-51. 
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of these actions can in principle trigger strong judicial remedies for the defen-
dant—reversal of conviction or dismissal of indictments—and direct sanctions 
against the prosecutor.   
Yet the existing remedies and sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct 
share a common defect: they are very rarely invoked.21  First, consider the 
principal appellate remedy for procedural violations related to the trial process: 
reversal of conviction, usually followed by retrial.  This remedy is so rarely 
granted in noncapital cases that some commentators have referred to it as a 
“dysfunctional” remedy for misconduct.22   The principal doctrinal basis for 
denying reversal is the harmless error doctrine, which requires affirmance if the 
violation did not affect the trial verdict.23  Prosecutorial misconduct is almost 
always deemed harmless, even quite serious misconduct such as deliberate 
withholding of exculpatory evidence.24  As Judge Posner wrote for the Seventh 
Circuit in United States v. Pallais, the doctrine renders procedural protections 
“like the grapes of Tantalus”—forever just out of reach of criminal defen-
dants—and seriously undermines courts’ ability to deter misconduct.25  And 
appeals courts’ toleration of misconduct may make trial courts less willing to 
enforce the underlying rights themselves.26 
But the harmless error doctrine is not the only obstacle to appellate re-
medies for prosecutorial misconduct.  In some contexts, the option of declaring 
misconduct harmless has been taken away from courts—and courts appear to 
have responded by avoiding recognizing misconduct in the first place, effec-
tively defining down the underlying rights.  For instance, the Supreme Court in 
Batson v. Kentucky reversed a conviction, without harmless error analysis, on 
the basis of prosecutorial race discrimination in jury venire selection; this case 
and its progeny have generally been understood to require automatic reversal.27  
Scholars have demonstrated, however, that since the establishment of this re-
medy, lower appellate courts have narrowed the circumstances under which 
they will find that race discrimination existed, “combining a deferential stan-
                                                 
21 E.g., Meares, supra, at 890, 893-898; Cicchini, supra, at 336; Joy, supra, at 425-26. 
22 Steele, supra, at 976-77; Alschuler, supra, at 645, 647; see United States v. Modica, 663 
F.2d 1173, 1184 (“Despite numerous threats to reverse convictions for prosecutorial mis-
conduct, federal courts have seldom invoked that sanction.”).  
23 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22, 24 (1967) (applying this doctrine to con-
stitutional violations); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52; see infra Part V.C. 
24 E.g., Meares, supra, at 900-01; Francis Allen, A Serendipitous Trek Through the Ad-
vance-Sheet Jungle: Criminal Justice in the Courts of Review, 70 IOWA L. REV. 311, 333 
(1985); Alschuler, supra, at 659; cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless 
Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 182-92 (2001) (reviewing 1222 criminal procedure cases—
not limited to prosecutorial misconduct—and finding that courts refused to reverse convic-
tions on the basis of the harmless error doctrine in 87% of them, with 45% finding harm-
less error and 42% finding that any error, if it existed, was harmless).   
25 921 F.2d 684, 691-92 (1990). 
26 See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 48 
(1990) (arguing that harmless error affects trial courts’ decisions by reducing fear of rever-
sal). 
27 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986). 
DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 6
dard of appellate review with a sweeping scope of permissible neutral explana-
tions for prosecutorial strikes.”28  That is, as Pam Karlan puts it, “lower courts . 
. . have responded to the fact that many Batson violations might be found 
harmless if harmless error analysis were performed by declining to find a viola-
tion in the first place.”29  Again, these loosened appellate standards may have 
spillover effects on trial courts’ own handling of alleged Batson violations—
trial courts have been directed to accept a broader range of prosecutorial expla-
nations for strikes, and they furthermore may be less willing to take on the 
costs of reconvening juries absent a serious fear of appellate reversal.30 
A similar defining-down appears to have taken place in the context of 
violations of the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, for which the 
Supreme Court has held that dismissal of the indictment with prejudice is the 
“only possible remedy.”31  Scholars and courts have recognized that this ex-
tremely costly remedy dissuades trial and appellate judges from finding viola-
tions, even in the face of “shockingly long delays.”32  As Susan Herman con-
cludes on the basis of her comprehensive review of speedy trial jurisprudence, 
the “severity of the remedy . . .  has had a profound effect on the development 
of speedy trial jurisprudence.”33  The result is that “the remedy of dismissal is 
granted in a tiny fraction of the thousands of constitutional speedy trial claims 
brought every year.”34 
These examples illustrate a broader phenomenon documented by a 
wealth of scholarship in criminal procedure and other fields of law:  if the re-
medy for a rights violation is undesirable, courts will find ways to avoid grant-
ing it, like narrowing the underlying right.35  Daryl Levinson, who has re-
                                                 
28Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 2001, 2005, 2015, 2021(1998); accord Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and 
Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 16 (1997).   See infra Part V.B. 
29 Karlan, supra, at 2021; see id. at 2014-23. 
30 The available trial-level remedies for Batson violations present their own costs—trial 
judges may accept dubious explanations for strikes in order to avoid reconvening a new 
jury pool. Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discrimina-
tory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099 (1994).  When trial-level 
remedies for rights violations are costly, effective appellate remedies are especially impor-
tant, because the risk of the appellate remedy “may be the major incentive the trial court 
has” to take on the costs of enforcing rights.  Stith, supra, at 48. 
31 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 522; see infra Part V.A. 
32 Amsterdam, supra, at 539; see United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 1972); 
Susan N. Herman, The Right to a Speedy and Public Trial 230 (2006) (“The reluctance of 
courts to invoke the ‘severe remedy’ of dismissal unquestionably has an impact on the wil-
lingness of courts to find a constitutional violation. . . .”); Amar, supra, at 646. 
33 Herman, supra, at 212. 
34 Id. at 231. 
35 E.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 857 (1999); Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1335, 1370 (2001); Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality, 65 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 735, 738 (1992).  I have elsewhere described a number of examples of remedial deter-
rence in international courts.  Starr, supra, at 710-736. 
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viewed this phenomenon in depth, calls it “remedial deterrence,” a phrase this 
Article borrows: the high cost of remedies deters courts from vindicating 
rights.36  For instance, numerous scholars have argued that after Mapp v. Ohio 
established the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, lower courts chipped 
away at the scope of the Fourth Amendment.37  Similarly, Stephen Clymer ar-
gues that in order to avoid dismissing indictments, courts have made it almost 
impossible to prove discriminatory selective prosecution.38   
But why are reversal or dismissal seen as high-cost remedies?  Reversal 
imposes the cost of retrial on the public, the parties and witnesses, and the 
court system, a concern frequently cited by courts39 and by commentators.40 
Judges may also see dismissals, or reversals that are not followed by reconvic-
tion,41 as creating undue windfalls.42  In addition, almost all state judges are 
elected and must pay attention to public opinion.43  The public may resent the 
costs of retrials or perceive them as unacceptable delays in justice,44 or may not 
focus on the possibility of retrial and simply perceive reversal (like dismissal) 
as letting a criminal off the hook.45   
                                                 
36 Levinson, supra, at 884-85. 
37 E.g., William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881 
(1991); Kamisar, supra, at 133-34; Calabresi, supra, at 112; Christopher Slobogin, Why 
Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363. 
38 Stephen D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 643, 683, 736 (1997) (“If a less draconian remedy was available, courts might be 
more willing to review charging decisions.”). 
39 E.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 73 (1986); United States v. Turner, 474 
F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007); Modica, 663 F.2d at 1184; Stringer v. Mississippi, 627 
So.2d 326 (Miss.1993). 
40 Posner, supra, at 644; Dunahoe, supra, at 95; Alschuler, supra, at 663. 
41 Retrial is precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause when the prosecutor’s misconduct 
was intended to trigger a mistrial.  Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982).  In other 
cases, retrial might be precluded in practice by loss of evidence, or it might result in an 
acquittal (even if the defendant is in fact guilty), see Posner, supra, at 644. 
42 See, e.g., Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 42 (1984) (describing the “windfall of au-
tomatic reversal”); North Dakota v. Tweeten, 679 N.W.2d 287, 291-92 (N.D. 2004) (hold-
ing that dismissal with prejudice “may serve to punish the public and provide a windfall for 
the defendant”); Kansas v. Bolen, 13 P.3d 1270, 1272 (Kan. 2000) (same). 
43 David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 265 (2008). 
44 See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1985) (Burger, J., dissenting) (“Few things 
have . . . contributed more to lowered public confidence in the courts, than the interminable 
appeals, the retrials, and the lack of finality.”). 
45 See, e.g., R.G. Ratcliffe, Opinions Divided On Judge in Dispute Over Condemned Man, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 10, 2007, p. B1 (explaining that a judge had been elected in “an 
atmosphere of public anger over criminals getting cases reversed on what appeared to be 
technicalities”); Patricia L. Garcia, Austin College Welcomes Texas Supreme Court, 70 
TEX. BAR J. 446, 446 (2007) (observing that a Tennessee state supreme court chief justice 
was unseated because “the public perceived [a controversial] ruling to be a reversal [even 
though] the court actually sent the case back to the trial court for review”); Dennis B. Rod-
dy, Judges Can’t Dismiss Popular Opinion, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, July 14, 1991, p. B1 
(describing “public anger” at judicial reversals of jury convictions and stating that “consen-
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To judges, then, it may seem like a better option to let the misconduct 
slide.  As Stanley Fisher put it: “Because courts are understandably reluctant to 
reverse convictions, even if the prosecutor’s conduct has been egregiously un-
ethical, . . . [they] may strain to excuse or overlook the prosecutor’s questiona-
ble conduct [or deem it] “harmless.”46  In short, when faced with all-or-nothing 
remedial choices, appellate courts tend to choose nothing.  
 Nor is there much hope for solving the problem via alternative sanc-
tions that would directly punish the prosecutor—contempt sanctions, fines, and 
referral for bar discipline—as some commentators have proposed.47   Courts 
already have these options, but if anything appear more reluctant to impose 
them than to grant reversal.48  Judges, it appears, simply do not have any appe-
tite for directly imposing personal or professional penalties on the prosecutors 
with whom they regularly interact.  Indeed, they rarely so much as identify 
misbehaving prosecutors by name in published opinions, even when they have 
reversed a defendant’s conviction.49  Courts may also wish to avoid risking 
over-deterring prosecutors from pursuing cases with appropriate zeal—the 
concern that underlies prosecutorial immunity to civil suits.50 
Other scholars have suggested that bar associations should themselves 
initiate disciplinary proceedings each time an appeals decision identifies mis-
conduct.51  Again, however, these proposals have gone nowhere.  Bar associa-
tions are notoriously lax in policing the ethics of any of their members, particu-
larly prosecutors, who are virtually never held accountable for misconduct even 
when it has been recognized by a court.52   
                                                                                                                            
sus in the legal community appears to be that judges are far more sensitive to popular opi-
nion than they would like to say”); Michael Hall, And Justice For Some, TEX. MONTHLY, 
Nov. 1, 2004, p. 154 (describing “outraged” public and media reaction to a 1993 reversal 
on procedural grounds). 
46 Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 212-13 
(1988). 
47 E.g., Henning, supra, at 828-31; Kelly Gier, Prosecuting Injustice: Consequences of 
Misconduct, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 205-06 (2006). 
48 See Steele, supra, at 978, 981; Alschuler, supra, at 633, 673-74 (stating that survey of 25 
years of reported decisions found no examples of courts imposing sanctions on prosecu-
tors); Dunahoe, supra, at n.146 (noting that the use of contempt sanctions has remained 
extremely infrequent in the decades since Alschuler’s article); id. at 83-84 (noting that oth-
er criminal sanctions are available but essentially never used); Meares, supra, at 893-97. 
49 Modica, 663 F.2d at 1185-86 & n.7; Dunahoe, supra, at 72; Henning, supra, at 830-31. 
50 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976); Dunahoe, supra, at 75. 
51 E.g., Joy, supra, at 427; Gier, supra, at 205; see also Steele, supra, at 982-88 (arguing 
for the creation of a special Prosecutors’ Grievance Council); Gershman, supra, at 454 
(making a similar proposal). 
52 Gier, supra, at 201; Steele, supra, at 966, 981-82; Gershman, supra, at 445 (noting that 
“despite the recognized frequency of misconduct by prosecutors in argument to the jury, 
this writer has found only one decision involving a disciplinary proceeding against a prose-
cutor for such conduct”); Dunahoe, supra, at 76-77; Meares, supra, at 899. 
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Some scholars have proposed that defendants who suffer constitutional 
wrongs be empowered to sue prosecutors in civil court.53  But even if the cur-
rent rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity were changed,54 damages probably 
would not be an effective deterrent.  Criminal defendants are not usually ap-
pealing civil plaintiffs,55 and may also have a difficult time quantifying damag-
es.56  In light of the dubious prospects of recovery, most may not bother to sue, 
especially given high litigation costs, the poverty of most criminal defendants, 
and the lack of appointed counsel for civil suits.57   Even if defendants did sue 
and win, individual prosecutors would be indemnified by the government under 
most states’ laws—if they were not, overdeterrence might be a serious con-
cern.58  And while the government would take a financial hit, it is uncertain 
what the effect might be.  Government agencies do not predictably respond to 
financial incentives the way private actors do; their budgets are under political 
control and can be increased to offset losses, and they may be more directly 
motivated by votes than by dollars.59 
Several scholars have proposed eliminating appellate courts’ discretion 
in responding to misconduct, and making remedies or sanctions automatic.60  
Such approaches carry some intuitive appeal, as part of the problem appears to 
be a lack of judicial backbone.  Even if courts are justified in their reluctance to 
grant remedies like reversal that carry hefty social costs, perhaps they should at 
least be willing to take other steps that seem less drastic, like publishing the 
misbehaving prosecutors’ names.61   
But even if courts should take these steps more often than they do, re-
quiring them to do so would be risky.  The lesson of the literature on remedial 
deterrence is that it is hard to force courts to issue remedies they don’t want to 
give.  When remedial discretion is taken away (as in Batson, for instance), 
courts tend to respond by redefining the underlying rights.  If a court is forced 
to sanction a prosecutor harshly in the event of misconduct, it may avoid re-
                                                 
53 See Alschuler, supra, at 669. 
54 See Imbler, 424 U.S. 409. 
55 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement 
Officials, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 284 (1988); Alschuler, supra, at 670. 
56 Meltzer, supra, at 284. 
57 Meares, supra, at 892-93. 
58 See Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Government Misconduct in Criminal 
Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 637 (1982) (discussing overdeterrence generally). For some 
forms of prosecutorial misconduct, there may be little cost to overdeterrence, however.  See 
Dunahoe, supra, at 88 (discussing disclosure violations). 
59 Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 361-62, 420 (2000); see also Dunahoe, su-
pra, at 49 (arguing that prosecutors respond to career incentives, not dollars). 
60 See Cicchini, supra, at 336 (proposing requiring mistrial in all misconduct cases and 
dismissal with prejudice for intentional misconduct); Joy, supra, at 427 (proposing that 
prosecutors’ offices “be required to implement a system of graduated discipline each time” 
a court finds misconduct); Kenneth Williams, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1177, 1200 (2002) (re-
commending requiring courts to refer prosecutors for bar discipline). 
61 See Gier, supra, at 205-06 (proposing requiring judges to publish names). 
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cognizing misconduct at all—and may thus appear to tolerate or even endorse 
specious prosecutorial practices.   
II. Sentence Reduction as an Alternative Remedy 
In light of the remedial deterrence problem, the best solution to prose-
cutorial misconduct may not be “stronger” remedies at all.  Rather, it may be 
better to give appellate courts the option of a lesser remedy—one which, if it is 
more likely to be invoked, may actually have a greater prospect of deterring 
prosecutorial misconduct and meaningfully vindicating defendants’ rights. 
Here, I propose sentence reduction as such an alternative.   Section A gives an 
overview of the proposal, and Section B argues that it will help solve the re-
medial deterrence problem.    
A.  The Proposal 
Appeals courts, upon identifying prosecutorial conduct resulting in a 
serious violation of a defendant’s rights but not affecting the trial verdict, 
should be empowered to reduce the defendant’s sentence as a remedy.  Al-
though this Article mostly focuses on appellate remedies, trial courts could 
likewise be empowered to reduce sentences (in addition to issuing curative in-
structions or other interlocutory remedies) for prosecutorial misconduct.  Sen-
tence reduction might also be permitted as a form of habeas corpus relief.   At 
any of these stages, the reduction could be a fixed amount, percentage of the 
sentence, or number of levels in a sentencing guidelines scheme; or the court 
could be permitted to tailor it to the violation.62   
If tailored, the reduction should be at least sufficient to compensate the 
defendant for any non-conviction-related harm she suffered, and bigger if ne-
cessary to deter or condemn misconduct effectively—i.e., in cases where the 
misconduct was significant but the harm to the defendant was relatively minor.  
For instance, deterrent and expressive rationales might require a greater reduc-
tion for deliberate, strategic misconduct than for conduct that had the same 
concrete effect on the proceedings but resulted from mere negligence. Like-
wise, a bigger reduction might be required to deter or condemn repeat prosecu-
torial offenders, even though the particular defendant receiving the reduction 
has suffered no additional harm due to the prosecutor’s prior misconduct. 
I do not suggest that sentence reduction would be appropriate in all 
cases of prosecutorial misconduct.  Often, reversal and other remedies are prin-
cipally intended to prevent the imposition of criminal punishment without the 
defendant’s guilt being reliably proven by the state—to avoid the risk of 
wrongful conviction.  Sentence reduction would be plainly inadequate to serve 
this purpose, and I do not advocate using it, at least not as the sole remedy,63 
                                                 
62 See infra Part VI (discussing these options). 
63 In theory, sentence reduction could supplement reversal—the defendant could be entitled 
to a reduction if reconvicted on retrial, to compensate for the stress and inconvenience of 
having to be tried twice.  This paper does not focus on that potential use of sentence reduc-
tion, but instead on its potential role as an alternative to remedies that courts are rarely 
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when prosecutorial misconduct undermines the court’s confidence in the fac-
tual validity of the conviction.   
But not every criminal procedure remedy serves that innocence protec-
tion rationale.  Sometimes, remedies are justified by the need to deter unconsti-
tutional conduct that, although it did not cause a miscarriage of justice in the 
case at hand, risks harming defendants in other cases or other members of so-
ciety.  Sometimes, they are grounded in corrective justice concerns, seeking to 
compensate for whatever harm the defendant did suffer even if she was not 
wrongfully convicted.   And remedies can also serve expressive purposes: they 
signify that society finds the misconduct morally blameworthy, and that it val-
ues the defendant’s humanity.   
Sentence reduction could plausibly serve these three functions, provid-
ing a way for courts to deter and condemn misconduct, and remedy any result-
ing injury, without providing an undue windfall to guilty defendants.  And 
none of these remedial purposes are well served by the current all-or-nothing 
remedies that courts are almost always unwilling to grant.  Instead, when a 
court identifies serious prosecutorial misconduct but concludes that the mis-
conduct did not affect the trial verdict, it might be better to permit the court to 
opt for a remedy of sentence reduction. 
Such an approach would amount to a “lesser” alternative to the current 
remedies for some kinds of misconduct and a “greater” alternative for most.  It 
would be a lesser remedy for misconduct that currently triggers automatic re-
versal or dismissal—e.g., speedy trial violations and Batson violations.  It 
would be a greater remedy for those forms of misconduct currently subject to 
harmless error review, which currently trigger no remedy at all if the court 
concludes the verdict was unaffected.  In Part V, I explore the application of 
my proposal to each of these categories of cases, and explain why sentence re-
duction can help to solve various problems scholars have identified with the 
Batson and speedy trial remedies and with the harmless error doctrine.  
B. Sentence Reduction and Remedial Deterrence 
If courts avoid issuing the various currently available remedies for pro-
secutorial misconduct, why should we expect them to be willing to order sen-
tence reductions?  Sentence reduction avoids a number of the costs associated 
with current remedies.  Perhaps most important, it does not require the time and 
expense of retrial.64  Nor does sentence reduction create the impression that a 
criminal is “getting off scot-free,” and thus it may not be as politically proble-
                                                                                                                            
willing to invoke; obviously, using sentence reduction as an additional remedy would not 
solve this remedial deterrence problem. 
64  This would be true even if a separate resentencing hearing were required  See United 
States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 461 (2005) (noting that resentencing procedures are 
“brief” and cost “far less” than retrials); Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 856, at 511-12 (2004). 
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matic.65  Because the court can tailor the reduction’s magnitude to the serious-
ness of the misconduct, the remedy need not feel—to the court or the public—
like a windfall.66  And some courts may even consider the resulting sentence to 
be a fairer one for the underlying crime—studies show that judges widely be-
lieve that modern sentencing schemes are overly harsh.67  
Because of the remedial deterrence problem, however, the sentence-
reduction scheme I propose does not include a direct sanction component ana-
logous to the one Calabresi as well as Caldwell and Chase propose for Fourth 
Amendment violations.  Those scholars suggest that the issuance of a sentence 
reduction should automatically trigger a fine or other direct sanction against the 
police officer who conducted the unlawful search.68  That proposal has some 
logical appeal if (as the authors concede) police officers do not care much 
about the sentence reduction itself, for otherwise the scheme would have little 
deterrent effect.  But if Kamisar’s response is correct—that courts will be un-
willing to sanction the police—then adding the automatic direct sanction com-
ponent may be worse than unhelpful; it may be counterproductive. Courts then 
could only avoid the direct sanction by declining to find a Fourth Amendment 
violation in the first place. 
In any event, regardless of whether they are willing to sanction police, 
it is very clear that courts are extremely reluctant to sanction prosecutors di-
rectly, even more reluctant than they are to reverse criminal convictions.69  So 
in the context of prosecutorial misconduct, it does not make sense to require 
                                                 
65 See supra Part I.  While the public generally favors strong sentences, see infra Part III.B, 
sentence reduction may nonetheless be more palatable than reversal and certainly more so 
than dismissal. Cf. Starr, supra, at 717-18 (discussing the Rwanda Tribunal’s turn to sen-
tence reduction as an alternate remedy when it was facing a catastrophic political backlash 
to its decision to release a genocide defendant on procedural grounds). 
66 See infra Part IV.C (discussing importance of proportionality and desert to public accep-
tance of remedies). 
67 See Calabresi, supra, at 116 (“Because the sentencing guidelines are so severe, judges 
are not unduly worried about whether a criminal goes to jail for thirty-five years as op-
posed to forty.”); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentenc-
ers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1214-15, 1222-23, 1236-37 (2004) (observing that while pros-
ecutors “love” the federal sentencing guidelines, judges think they are too severe and sen-
tence at the bottom of the range); Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebel-
lion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 
1043, n.252 (2001). 
68 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
69 While studies have found virtually no instances of direct sanctions, see supra Part I, the 
Center for Public Integrity’s study of appellate opinions nationwide between 1970 and 
2003 found 2012 cases in which courts granted the defendant a remedy for prosecutorial 
misconduct.  See Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a Prosecutor is 
Cited for Misconduct?, The Center for Public Integrity, June 26, 2003, available at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/pm/ 
default.aspx?sID=main (noting, however, that this still means reversals are a “relative rari-
ty,” that most decisions find harmless error, and that most instances of misconduct are 
probably never discussed in appellate opinions).  
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direct sanctions—the likely result would be remedial deterrence.  Instead, an 
effective sentence reduction scheme must stand on its own merits, rather than 
merely being a trigger for the “real” sanction.  Thus, for the scheme to work, 
the fear of sentence reduction itself must adequately deter prosecutorial mis-
conduct.  The next Part considers whether it can do so. 
III. Sentence Reduction as a Deterrent: Prosecutors’ Incentives 
The effectiveness of a remedy in deterring prosecutorial misconduct 
turns on two factors: the probability that it will be invoked in the event of mis-
conduct, and the cost it imposes on prosecutors if it is invoked.70  The econom-
ic literature on deterrence in other contexts strongly suggests that the first fac-
tor is by far the most important.71  This exacerbates the problem with the cur-
rent remedial scheme—deterrent schemes that rely on large penalties to com-
pensate for very low probability of punishment tend to fail.72  If, as I argue 
above, courts are significantly more likely to grant sentence reduction than the 
present remedies, that factor may far outweigh the difference between the mag-
nitudes of the cost experienced by prosecutors. 
And indeed, many commentators have recognized that although appel-
late reversals are costly to prosecutors, their rarity greatly undermines their de-
terrent effect.73  As the Second Circuit observed in United States v. Modica, 
“[g]iven this Court’s unwillingness to use reversals as a means of disciplining 
prosecutors, threats to do so seem unlikely to have much effect.  As a practical 
matter, prosecutors know that courts are reluctant to overturn convictions be-
cause of improper remarks, when the defendant’s guilt is clear.”74  
Still, even a high likelihood of sentence reduction will not deter mis-
conduct unless it imposes some cost on prosecutors that outweighs the gains 
misconduct offers. Oren Bick, the author of the most comprehensive scholarly 
article on sentence reduction in Canada, has questioned its deterrent value, al-
                                                 
70 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 289, 292 (1983) (discussing deterrence of crime). 
71 E.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 
349, 380 & n.112 (1997) (citing studies showing disproportionate effect of probability and 
arguing that the best explanation is that low probability undermines the informal social 
stigma that accompanies formal penalties); Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Eco-
nomic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169.176 n.12 (1968) (“Certainty of detection is far more 
important than severity of punishment.”).  
72 See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. 
UNIV. L. REV. 655, 660 (2006) (arguing that “[d]eterrence falls off rapidly (and nonlinear-
ly) with lower probabilities of enforcement, and higher penalties are unable to counteract 
these losses” and citing explanations including social stigma and heuristic risk assessment).   
73 See Cicchini, supra, at 348; Meares, supra, at 900; Steele, supra, at 976-77; Alschuler, 
supra, at 647; see also supra Part V.C (collecting scholarship arguing that harmless error 
review undermines deterrence). 
74 663 F.2d at 1183. 
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though he provides no empirical basis for his position and does not focus on 
prosecutors specifically.75   
In this Part, I examine prosecutorial incentives and conclude that sen-
tence reduction would likely be an effective deterrent. No empirical studies 
have given a comprehensive account of all of the various factors influencing 
prosecutorial behavior and their relative importance.76  Still, these factors are 
illustrated, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, by a large body of empirical and theo-
retical scholarship on plea-bargaining, charging, and other prosecutorial beha-
vior.  This Part draws from that literature insights into how prosecutors might 
respond to the risk of remedial sentence reduction.  Section A briefly addresses 
the gains prosecutors seek through misconduct; Section B considers the costs 
imposed by sentence reduction from the perspective of several different theo-
retical models of prosecutorial incentives; and Section C reviews the existing 
empirical evidence about prosecutors’ sentencing-related behavior. 
A. The Gains Offered By Misconduct 
Before considering the costs that sentence reduction imposes on prose-
cutors, a word is in order about the gains they seek from misconduct, as it is the 
comparison between expected costs and expected gains that determines the re-
medy’s deterrent effect. 
Usually, deliberate misconduct is presumably committed to increase the 
chance of conviction.77 This is true even in cases in which the misconduct can 
be identified as “harmless” ex post.  Such misconduct must have been commit-
ted because of a perceived benefit, even it ultimately brought the prosecutor no 
gain—the ex ante decision to commit misconduct has to be based on a proba-
bilistic risk assessment because the prosecutor has incomplete information 
about how the trial will go.78  Some misconduct may also be motivated by non-
conviction-related reasons—for instance, speedy trial violations may often be 
the product of negligence or laziness. 
If misbehaving prosecutors are motivated by a desire for convictions, it 
might be objected, how can a remedy that fails to reverse convictions deter 
them?  I concede that sentence reduction cannot accomplish perfect deterrence, 
nor can any other remedial scheme—in some cases the gains from misconduct 
                                                 
75 Bick, supra, at 221.   
76 See Dunahoe, supra, at 59; Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating 
Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 942, 966-67 (1997);  see also 
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 46 n.158 (1997) (noting that most literature on prosecutors uses a 
fairly unsophisticated model of incentives). 
77 See Alicia M. Hilton, Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule After Hudson v. Michigan, 
53 VILL. L. REV. 47, 80 (2008) (discussing studies on why prosecutors lie or suborn per-
jury); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 430 (1992) 
(discussing why prosecutors make improper statements). 
78 See Gershman, supra, at 430 (“That prosecutors actually do assess the risks and benefits 
associated with misconduct is an intuitively, anecdotally, and empirically well-founded 
conclusion.”).  
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will be too tempting.  For instance, suppose a prosecutor whose overriding 
priority was getting convictions were 100% certain that misconduct would 
make the difference between winning and losing a particular case.  It would not 
be possible to deter her from committing the misconduct via a threat of sen-
tence reduction as the only possible remedy, because even if that remedy were 
imposed, it would leave her gain partially intact. 
But if sentence reduction imposes a significant cost on prosecutors and 
its imposition is relatively likely, it may deter a large number of instances of 
misconduct even assuming that prosecutors generally care more about convic-
tions than about sentences.  This is principally because the gains of misconduct 
are also subject to uncertainty.  The situation facing prosecutors is rarely so 
black and white as the hypothetical above—especially in the kinds of cases that 
are the focus of this Article, namely those in which the misconduct is ultimate-
ly found not to have affected the verdict.  If the same prosecutor believes that 
committing misconduct will increase the likelihood of conviction from, say, 
75% to 85%, then it will be possible to deter her with a threat of sentence re-
duction, provided that the cost and likelihood of the reduction impose an ex-
pected penalty that exceeds the 10% chance of the greater gain.  
In addition, the scheme I propose does not leave sentence reduction as 
the only possible remedy.  Rather, it maintains reversal as a required remedy 
for cases in which misconduct does affect the verdict, and leaves it optional for 
other cases.  Sentence reduction would apply only in cases in which the verdict 
was unaffected—in which the prosecutor, in theory, achieved no conviction-
related gain due to the misconduct.  So it imposes a cost that, if the harmless-
ness determination is accurate,79 is unaccompanied by a prosecutorial gain.  
In any event, the potential gains from misconduct will vary from case 
to case, and I do not give an extended account of those gains here, other than 
explaining why various prosecutorial motivations lead them to care about con-
victions as well as sentences.  The gains offered by undetected misconduct will 
be the same regardless of the remedial scheme; what differs is the likelihood 
that the court will identify the misconduct and the cost of the penalty imposed 
in that event.  Thus, the remainder of this Part focuses on comparing the cost 
and likelihood provided by sentence reduction with those provided by current 
all-or-nothing remedial schemes.   
B. Models of Prosecutorial Incentives 
Although prosecutors’ interests vary, there are many reasons to believe 
that most of them would consider a court-ordered sentence reduction to be a 
significant penalty for misconduct.  Such reductions would impair a variety of 
different objectives that are each likely to be important to many prosecutors.  
Here, I assess the costs imposed by sentence reduction from the perspective of 
                                                 
79 Prosecutors might still gain if courts wrongly deem errors harmless. But the same weak-
ness afflicts harmless error review under current all-or-nothing remedial schemes—at least 
with sentence reduction as an option, the prosecutor does not retain all the benefits of a 
conviction in such instances. 
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several different ideal-typical prosecutors, each representing one of those dif-
ferent objectives. 
(1) Deterring crime.  First, consider a hypothetical prosecutor, 
McGruff, motivated solely by the desire to use the office’s resources efficiently 
to reduce crime as much as possible.  Many scholars writing about prosecutori-
al decision-making from a law-and-economics perspective have assumed that 
this is what motivates prosecutors.80  And indeed, it is probably safe to say that 
this is at least a significant part of many prosecutors’ motivations.81 Prosecu-
tors, after all, have chosen careers in law enforcement, usually over higher-
paying private-sector jobs, perhaps for altruistic reasons.82  Moreover, their su-
periors generally have a strong political interest in reducing crime,83 and that 
interest may influence line prosecutors via office policies and norms.84   
  McGruff would generally prefer longer sentences for crimes to shorter 
ones.  As Frank Easterbrook explained, he seeks to “obtain the maximum de-
terrence from his available resources.”85  Because deterrence is a function of 
both the probability and the magnitude of the penalty, the prosecutor seeks “to 
maximize the expected number of convictions weighted by their respective 
[sentences],” insofar as his budget will allow.86  McGruff, in short, seeks to 
maximize expected sentence-years.  He is willing to accept shorter sentences 
                                                 
80 E.g., Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, n.123 
(2005); Scott Baker et al., Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to 
Go to Trial, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 149, 154-55 (2001); Easterbrook, supra, at 295-96; Wil-
liam M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 63 (1971); see 
also Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize?  An Analysis of the Federa-
lization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 261 (2000) (assuming that along with 
considering “career concerns,” prosecutors “seek to reduce crime”).  
81 See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 321, 330 (2002) (“Prosecutors, like virtually everyone else, view crime as a grave 
problem.”); Glaeser et al., supra, at 268 (finding empirical support, based on federal prose-
cutors’ charging decisions, for both the propositions that prosecutors maximize social wel-
fare and that they maximize career advancement).   Prosecutors no doubt also have compet-
ing personal interests that may diverge from the public interest in deterrence.  Keith N. 
Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 61, 73 (2007); accord William J. Stuntz, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1893 
(2000); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 43, 50-51 (1988); Easterbrook, supra, at 300-01.  However, as Schulhofer 
observes, in the comparatively few cases that go to trial (i.e., those most likely to give rise 
to the types of prosecutorial misconduct discussed in this Article), even prosecutors primar-
ily interested in private career concerns have a strong reputational interest in pursuing the 
“public interest in deterrence,” because their “professional competence is openly on dis-
play.”  Schulhofer, supra, at 63-64. 
82 See Richman, Old Chief, supra, at 966. 
83 See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
84 See infra notes 119 and accompanying text. 
85 Easterbrook, supra, at 295-96. 
86 Landes, supra, at 63.  See also Smith, supra, at n.123 (noting that “two key factors in 
deciding whether or not to prosecute will be the likelihood of conviction and the potential 
punishment”). 
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pursuant to plea-bargains in exchange for certainty of conviction (avoiding the 
risk that no sentence-years will result) and saved resources (allowing him to 
pursue more sentence-years in other cases).  But once he has decided to pursue 
a case to trial, receiving a reduced sentence is plainly a setback.87 
(2) Efficient case processing.  Second, consider another hypothetical 
prosecutor, Sleepy, who is less public-minded—she is motivated entirely by 
the desire to maximize her own leisure time without losing her job, and thus 
seeks to dispose of her docket as quickly as she can get away with doing.  
While it would be unfair to suggest that many prosecutors are like Sleepy, it is 
reasonable to assume that most do consider efficient management of their 
dockets to be an important part of the job (as, in fact, does the more altruistic 
McGruff).88  So Sleepy serves as a useful ideal type.   
Sleepy seeks to induce as many defendants as possible to plead guilty 
on terms that are minimally sufficient to satisfy Sleepy’s superiors.  But defen-
dants will not plead guilty unless they believe that, should they refuse, Sleepy 
will take them to trial and win an expected sentence longer than the one they 
will receive if they plead.  Sleepy thus wants a high ratio between expected tri-
al sentences and expected post-plea sentences—a high expected penalty for 
going to trial.89  Thus, while Sleepy does not seek to increase the sentences of 
those defendants who plead guilty (indeed, she seeks to reduce them), she does 
want high sentences for those who go to trial.  So a sentence reduction based 
on her trial misconduct, again, would count as a setback. 
To be sure, some defendants no doubt enter plea agreements without 
much information about the specific prosecutor they face, which weakens 
Sleepy’s incentive to pursue a reputation for winning high sentences at trial.  
But that point applies equally to the reversal remedy—if her reputation doesn’t 
matter to her ability to get pleas, Sleepy shouldn’t care about avoiding reversal.  
Indeed, Sleepy shouldn’t have any incentive to commit deliberate misconduct 
during the trial process either, which would make her incentives largely irrele-
vant.  If Sleepy does care about convictions enough to be willing to commit 
misconduct, it must be because she does think at least some future defendants 
                                                 
87 If McGruff’s understanding of deterrence theory is particularly sophisticated, taking into 
account discounting, then it will take a larger sentence reduction to deter him from miscon-
duct the longer the base sentence is.  Economist-prosecutor McGruff would understand that 
each added year in a criminal sentence has a decreasing marginal deterrent effect on crime, 
because criminals (like other people) care less about potential harms that await them far 
into the future.  See Easterbrook, supra, at 295. 
88 Commentators writing about prosecutorial incentives generally so assume.  E.g., Stuntz, 
supra, at n.159.  In addition, one relatively recent survey of federal prosecutors found a 
“growing trend” so-called “deadwood” career prosecutors who “seek the easiest types of 
cases.”  Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United 
States Attorneys’ Offices, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 285-87 (2002); but see id. at 287 (suggesting that 
such prosecutors still remain a relatively small minority). 
89 See Miller, supra, at 1258 (arguing that a “high plea/trial differential” encourages plea-
bargaining and “reflects prosecutorial dominance”). 
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or their counsel will take her reputation for trial success into account when de-
ciding whether to plead. 
 (3) Career advancement.  Now consider Hotshot and Moneybags, 
young ADAs whose sole objective is to advance their own career ambitions.  
Again, these are merely ideal types—but many commentators have suggested 
that career interests are important motivators for prosecutors.90  Hotshot hopes 
to climb the internal office ladder; Moneybags plans to cash in on his expe-
rience by moving to a private law firm in two or three years.91  Their motiva-
tions differ in some ways—Moneybags may be especially concerned with gain-
ing particularly relevant trial experience or with having positive interactions 
with the defense bar.92  But like Hotshot, Moneybags cares about impressing 
his superiors by successfully implementing the office’s institutional agenda—
Moneybags may not be seeking internal promotion, but he does need positive 
references and a general reputation as a successful prosecutor.93   
Both Hotshot and Moneybags are likely to prefer longer sentences.   
Many offices actually require their line prosecutors to seek the highest availa-
ble sentences.94  Junior prosecutors’ job performance is often evaluated in part 
                                                 
90 E.g., Dunahoe, supra, at 49, 60; Lochner, supra, at 277; JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL 
FOR THE UNITED STATES 174 (1978). 
91 Much of the literature on prosecutors has focused on federal prosecutors, and has as-
sumed that most of them are transient like Moneybags. See Lochner, supra, at 272-74 (re-
viewing literature).  Interestingly, this appears no longer to be accurate, as Todd Lochner’s 
more recent study finds that the composition of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices has shifted heavily 
toward careerists like Hotshot.  Id. at 281-84.  In any event, as discussed below, Hotshot 
and Moneybags are likely to have fairly similar reasons to avoid sentence reductions. 
92 See Richard T. Boylan et al., Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal 
Prosecutors, 48 J. L. & ECON. 627, 627-28, 648 (2005) (finding that in districts with high 
private-sector salaries, federal prosecutors seek to impress private sector employers by 
bringing high-profile cases to trial). 
93 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 620 (“Future employers will eva-
luate a prosecutor by his success in litigation. . . .”); Fisher, supra, at 206 (noting that both 
transient and career prosecutors face “pressures to demonstrate professional competence”). 
94 Under both Bush Administrations, for instance, DOJ has held that prosecutors have a 
“General Duty to Charge and to Pursue the Most Serious, Readily Provable Offense in All 
Federal Prosecutions,” where seriousness is measured by length of sentence.  Memoran-
dum from John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors [hereinafter Ashcroft Memo] (Sept. 22, 
2003), available at http://www.crimelynx.com/ashchargememo.html; Memorandum from 
Richard Thornburgh to Federal Prosecutors, “Plea Policy for Federal Prosecutors” (1989), 
reprinted in 6 Federal Sentencing Reporter 347 (1994); see Miller, supra, at 1255 (observ-
ing that this “basic policy” in fact dates back to 1980); but see id. at 1257 (noting excep-
tions to these policies).   “The use of statutory enhancements is strongly encouraged” and 
prosecutors are instructed to seek increased penalties “in all appropriate cases.”  Ashcroft 
Memo, supra. Since 2005, federal prosecutors have additionally been required to oppose 
every sentence below the appropriate Guidelines range.  Memorandum from James B. 
Comey to All Federal Prosecutors (Jan. 28, 2005), available at 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/dag_jan_28_comey_memo
_on_booker.pdf.   
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on the basis of the sentences they obtain.95 Conviction rate is also important, of 
course,96 and appellate reversal would presumably be a bigger “loss” than a 
reduced sentence—so to be as effective in deterring Hotshot and Moneybags 
from misconduct, sentence reduction would have to be perceived as more like-
ly.  And efficient docket management is also generally an important measure-
ment of performance—so Hotshot and Moneybags, like Sleepy, have an inter-
est in maintaining a high trial penalty.   
Even more than they fear the sentence reduction in and of itself, Hot-
shot and Moneybags are likely to fear the professional embarrassment of being 
found by an appellate court to have committed wrongdoing.97  Perhaps they 
might not experience much professional harm as a result of a lenient trial judge 
simply going easy on a defendant—their superiors might not even notice and 
might not hold it against Hotshot or Moneybags if they did notice.  But what if 
an appeals court ordered a reduction in the trial sentence on the express basis of 
a prosecutor’s violation of the defendant’s rights?  Even assuming the court 
named no names, there is little doubt that their superiors would find out.98 
So if having the option of a lesser remedy (sentence reduction rather 
than reversal) makes the court more willing to make an embarrassing finding of 
prosecutorial wrongdoing, that option might deter Hotshot and Moneybags 
even assuming they didn’t care very much about the length of the sentence it-
self.  In theory, this reputational sanction might have some deterrent effect 
even absent any concrete remedy—i.e., where misconduct is identified but 
deemed harmless.  But Hotshot and Moneybags may well assume that their col-
leagues won’t put much stock in such toothless reprimands—many scholars 
                                                 
95 NAT’L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOC., PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR PROSECUTORS 14 
(2007), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/performance_measures_findings_07.pdf. 
(listing “sentence length” as one of eight “core performance measures” for prosecutors); 
Fisher, supra, at 206 (observing that prosecutors’ “professional competence . . . tends to be 
measured in terms of ‘wins,’ i.e., ‘heavy’ convictions and sentences”); Meares, supra, at 
885 (“One way that effectiveness can be measured is by a combination of the prosecutor’s 
conviction rate and the severity of sentences on those convictions.”). 
96 See, e.g., Richman, Old Chief, supra, at 968; Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Refer-
rals in the Federal System, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1045 (1972).  
97 See Meares, supra, at 918 & n.52 (observing that prosecutors care greatly about impress-
ing colleagues and seek to “avoid embarrassing losses”); Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Con-
trol in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 57 (1967) (stating that prosecutors 
seek “a reputation for utter credibility”); Richman, Old Chief, supra, at 968-69 (citing 
Skolnick, supra); Fisher, supra, at 215-16 (noting that a reputation for overzealousness can 
harm prosecutors’ career prospects). 
98 Embarrassment would be an even bigger concern if courts did publish the names of mis-
behaving prosecutors—but even though courts almost never do so now, reversals still trig-
ger professional consequences. See Alshuler, supra, at 647 (noting that an ADA’s superiors 
“read appellate opinions’ and that when “the behavior of an assistant district attorney leads 
to a reversal, his superiors know about it”).  Even the so-called “deadwood” AUSAs de-
scribed by Lochner might likewise be motivated to avoid this embarrassment, since judi-
cially punished misconduct might provide the rare “good cause” needed to fire under-
performing civil servants.  See Lochner, supra, at 283-84. 
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and courts have observed that prosecutors pay limited attention to judicial find-
ings of rights violations until they are combined with some effect on the “bot-
tom line.”99 
(4) Winning. A fifth hypothetical prosecutor, Champ, is hyper-
competitive—he thrives on the adversarial process, and his overriding incen-
tive is simply to win.  Although he represents an extreme, competitiveness is a 
trait he shares with many prosecutors.100   Champ pays a lot of attention to his 
conviction rate.  But he doesn’t just want to rack up easy convictions—he 
wants high-stakes wins, and thus aims for severe sentences.101  He wants to win 
at the sentencing stage of the proceeding, not just at the trial stage—indeed, in 
a system dominated by plea-bargaining, sentence length is the main way he can 
quantify his success.  Because he also wants to induce the most favorable pleas, 
he too needs to maintain a steep trial penalty, requiring high sentences after 
trial convictions.  And he wants to win on appeal, too, which means preserving 
the trial result.102  A sentence reduction based on his misconduct would thus 
amount to a loss. 
                                                 
99 Fisher, supra, at 213; accord United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d at 691-92 (7th Cir.); Al-
len, supra, at 334.  One former federal prosecutor told me that the actual inclusion of the 
word “misconduct” in an opinion might significantly embarrass prosecutors even absent a 
concrete remedy, because that word is understood as a signal, and that courts vary in their 
willingness to use this term.  Email from Mary Fan, August 18, 2008.  To avoid remedial 
deterrence, my proposal would not require courts to use that term; sentence reduction 
would be triggered by the finding of a rights violation caused by the prosecutor’s actions, 
not by any “magic word.”  In addition, while most prosecutors might well be ashamed by a 
misconduct finding standing alone, the “bad actors” who commit most misconduct may be 
likelier to disregard such findings absent some remedy.  Reviews of appellate opinions 
show that misconduct “is frequently committed by repeat prosecutorial offenders,” Duna-
hoe, supra, at 68, suggesting that some prosecutors are not significantly discouraged by a 
first finding of misconduct, much less removed from their jobs as a result. 
100 See Meares, supra, at 918 (describing the “desire to win” as “a primary characteristic of 
existing prosecutorial culture”); Richman, Old Chief, supra, at 967-68; Fisher, supra, at 
198 (discussing “conviction psychology”). 
101 See Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
1477, 1505 (1999) (arguing that “the desire to win, weighted by the stakes in the case 
(roughly, the sentence if the defendant is convicted), is the most important argument in the 
prosecutorial utility function”); Fisher, supra, at 206, 208 (arguing that the adversary sys-
tem drives prosecutors toward “maximizing convictions and punishments” and that “wins” 
are defined as “‘heavy’ convictions and sentences”). 
102 Even if Champ turned over the appeal to a different prosecutor, as is common, see 
James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2120 & n.224 
(2000), loss on appeal would hurt his “bottom line.” See Meares, supra, at 900.  Liebman 
notes that the length of capital appeals processes means that the trial prosecutor involved 
may have left the agency by the time the appeal is decided.   Liebman, supra, at 2119-
2120.  This is less true in non-capital cases, in which appeals are more efficient, but in any 
event, such turnover would hamper the deterrent effect of any appellate remedy equally. 
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(5) Political gain.  What about Chief, the elected district attorney?103  
Her motives, let’s hypothesize, are purely political—she responds to votes.104  
Chief will want to reduce crime, because voters pay great attention to crime 
rates—so she will share McGruff’s incentives.105  Beyond the actual crime 
rates, Chief also wants to appear tough on crime and successful against crimi-
nals.  That means pushing for tough sentences, which the public overwhel-
mingly supports.106  And it means that (like Champ) she cares about the bottom 
line—she wants her office to win,107 which includes winning tough sen-
tences.108  On the other hand, Chief also doesn’t want to be perceived as abus-
ing her power or letting her line prosecutors do so.  So she is likely to be em-
barrassed by a judicial opinion reducing a sentence on the basis of her miscon-
duct or that of her subordinates.109  Even if the opinion does not name the indi-
vidual prosecutor involved, it makes the office as a whole look bad.  And if the 
public is distressed by the reduced sentence, it may hold her to blame. 
6.  Justice.  Finally, let’s imagine a different sort of prosecutor, Angel.  
Angel’s sole motivation is the one set forth for all prosecutors by the Supreme 
Court, and one many prosecutors fortunately take seriously: to “do justice.”110  
As she sees it, her duty is to seek fair punishments for crime.  Angel is of 
                                                 
103 See Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incen-
tives of Criminal Prosecutors, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334, 335 (2002) (noting that over 95% of 
chief prosecutors at the state and local level are elected). 
104 E.g., James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1521, 1558 (1981); see also Levinson, Making Government Pay, supra, at 420 (discussing 
incentives of government actors generally). 
105 See Daniel C. Richman and William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the 
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 602-03 (arguing 
that DAs are “fixated” on crime rate reports); Thompson, supra, at 331. 
106 See, e.g., Talbot “Sandy” D’Alemberte, A Critique of Roscoe Pound’s Popular Dissatis-
faction with the Administration of Justice, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 969, 971-72 (2007) (citing 
the “political reward for prosecutors who . . . obtain long sentences”); Gordon & Huber, 
supra, at 335 n.1 (finding that 77% of surveyed sample wanted harsher sentences). Even 
unelected prosecutors may be subject to political pressures to increase sentences. See 
SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION TO PROSECUTE 144-45 (1977) (discussing congressional 
oversight of DOJ antitrust prosecution policy). 
107 See Gordon & Huber, supra, at 350 (arguing that “voters will always reward prosecu-
tors for obtaining convictions”); Richman, Old Chief, supra, at 967; Gordon Van Kessel, 
Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 442 n. 
164 (1992); Fisher, supra, at 205. 
108 See Gordon & Huber, supra, at 337 (noting that district attorney candidates emphasize 
sentences in addition to conviction rates) 
109 Id. at 335 & n.2 (noting that misconduct sometimes produces “well-publicized scan-
dals”); Fisher, supra, at 207 (“Unless it results in reversal of the conviction or public scan-
dal, the prosecutor’s choice to act ‘overzealously’ can be cost-free.”).  
110 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1938) (holding that the government’s in-
terest is “that justice shall be done”). See also Fisher, supra, at 216 (citing professional 
standards). 
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course unlikely to commit unconstitutional misconduct to begin with,111 so her 
incentives are less important—but let’s assume that she can be tempted into a 
fall from grace, so to speak, if it serves what she sees as a just end.   
Angel does not aim for severe punishments per se—she may think le-
niency is appropriate in some circumstances, and severity in others.  But she 
nonetheless would want to avoid sentence reduction on the basis of miscon-
duct.  After all, she has extremely broad discretion over charging112 and plea-
bargaining,113 and she can also make a sentence recommendation that judges 
are likely to take seriously (and rarely exceed).114  So Angel has plenty of tools 
available to achieve a lower sentence for a particular defendant if that’s what 
justice requires.  Once she has selected the charges, won at trial or accepted a 
plea, and recommended a sentence, the defendant will usually receive a sen-
tence no higher than what she believed was just.  A subsequent sentence reduc-
tion on the basis of misconduct will seem, to Angel, to subvert the ends of jus-
tice.  Moreover, as an ethically conscious member of the profession, she may 
“find a judicial rebuke especially stinging.”115 
None of these archetypes, of course, perfectly describes real-world 
prosecutors. Different prosecutors have varying incentives116—even within the 
same office117—and each may have multiple interests.118  Most prosecutors 
probably do want to reduce crime and achieve just outcomes, but also cannot 
help but care about their careers and reputations, have no choice but to seek 
efficient docket management, and feel driven to win.  In addition, their prefe-
rences are not fixed—they are shaped in part by their office culture,119 and they 
may evolve over the course of their career.120  Yet the hypotheticals above sug-
gest that despite this complexity, virtually all prosecutors will be dismayed by a 
                                                 
111 If Angel follows the Supreme Court’s admonition to do justice, she will avoid using 
“improper methods” to achieve a conviction.  See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. 
112 Even if office policy requires her to charge the most serious possible offense, in practice 
she probably has some discretion.  See Miller, supra, at 1257 (noting loopholes in Bush 
administration policies); Richman, supra, at 2068-69; Dunahoe, supra, at 63. 
113 E.g., Bowman & Heise, supra, at 1122-24. 
114 Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1011 n.3 (2005); see Bowman & Heise, supra, at 
1116-18 (noting that federal prosecutors can loosely define “substantial assistance” to justi-
fy a downward sentencing departure). 
115 Alschuler, supra, at 647. 
116 See Richman, Prosecutors and their Agents, supra, at 758; Bowman & Heise, supra, at 
1048-49. 
117 See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Dis-
cretion (Feb. 24, 2008), avail. at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1099064#PaperDownload; Richman, supra, at 2056. 
118 E.g., Glaeser et al., supra, at 260-61, 268. 
119 See Meares, supra, at 918; Fisher, supra, at 209-210; Leanord R. Mellon et al., The 
Prosecutor Constrained by His Environment, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 79 
(1981). 
120 See, e.g., Fisher, supra, at 206-07; George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Real-
ity, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 117. 
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sentence reduction issued on the basis of their misconduct.  As pertains to sen-
tencing, their motivations are mutually reinforcing. 
C. Evidence About Real Prosecutors’ Preferences 
Most scholars have assumed that prosecutors generally prefer higher 
sentences,121 and the existing empirical evidence supports that conclusion.  
First, prosecutors’ offices tend to support tough sentencing laws.122  Some 
scholars suggest that this is because such systems increase prosecutors’ control 
over the plea-bargaining process, not because of a preference for harshness per 
se.123  Even if so, however, that rationale supports the point that prosecutors 
require a significant trial penalty124—even if they do not mind leniency for de-
fendants who plead, they want post-trial sentences to be harsh, and thus would 
want to avoid sentence reduction as a consequence of misconduct during the 
pretrial or trial process.  In addition, prosecutors who can choose to charge par-
ticular conduct under one of several criminal provisions generally choose the 
one carrying the highest sentence.125  As noted above, many offices require 
prosecutors to do so.126   District attorney candidates sometimes campaign on a 
platform of increased sentence severity.127  And the culture of prosecutors’ of-
fices may create “pressures . . . to renounce quasi-judicial values in favor of 
pursuing penal severity.”128 
There may well be exceptions—not every prosecutor pushes for the 
strongest sentence in every circumstance, obviously, just as not every prosecu-
                                                 
121 See, e.g., Smith, supra, at 896, 928 (noting that prosecutors “have strong institutional 
reasons to prefer severity” and that “increase in the potential punishment will tend to make 
a prosecution more attractive”); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1480 (1993) (stating that in plea-bargaining, prosecutors 
will “seek to maximize ‘profit’ [by extracting pleas near] the upper end of the range of sen-
tencing outcomes”); Albert Alschuler, Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 50, 52 (1968) (noting that prosecutors seek to “maximize both the number of convic-
tions and the severity of the sentences”); see supra note 80. 
122 See, e.g., Troy Anderson, D.A., Sheriff Say Inmates Will Soon Serve Longer Terms, 
DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Nov. 9, 2006, at N6; Bob Bernick Jr., No more 5-to-life sentences for 
killers in Utah?, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Sept. 25, 2005; Matthew Franck, Prosecutors 
criticize child-sex bill, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 27, 2006, at D4; Andy Furillo, Re-
visions to three-strikes law sought, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at F4; Jonathan 
Saltzman, Push is on to Keep Sex Criminals Locked Up, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 2005, at 
A1; Range Stacey, Embezzlers may face tougher penalties under Mich. Proposal, LANSING 
ST. J., Sept. 25, 2006, at 1A. 
123 E.g., Miller, supra, at 1215.   
124 Indeed, as Miller puts it, prosecutors like the federal sentencing guidelines because they 
have created “vastly greater prosecutorial control not only after the actual sentences, but 
over the plea/trial differential.”  Id. at 1253. 
125 Smith, supra, at 922-925. 
126 See supra note 94. 
127 Sanford & Huber, supra, at 337. 
128 Fisher, supra, at 254-55; see supra notes 100, 119. 
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tor seeks convictions at all costs.129   For instance, in federal drug cases, given 
the particularly harsh applicable sentencing laws, prosecutorial leniency may 
be disproportionately common.130  But as a general rule, most prosecutors, even 
the Angels, would prefer to avoid sentence reductions.  
Moreover, the same subcategory of prosecutors who are the most likely 
to commit misconduct—the most overzealous ones, not the Angels—may ex-
perience the most harm from a sentence reduction. Many scholars have sug-
gested that both a tendency to commit misconduct and an especially strong pre-
ference for “penal severity over other potential goals” are symptoms of the 
same underlying characteristic, namely “overzealousness.”131   
Although prosecutors are likely to care less about sentences than about 
convictions,132 sentence reduction might actually amount to a more serious pe-
nalty than appellate reversal, if sentence reductions were made final while re-
versed convictions can be reinstated after retrial.133  In any case, convictions 
clearly aren’t everything to prosecutors—for instance, they often charge more 
serious offenses carrying higher sentences even when doing so significantly 
increases the chance of acquittal.134  
The trick to improving deterrence vis-à-vis the all-or-nothing system—
and it may be a challenging one—would be calibrating the sentence reduction 
to a magnitude that is significant enough for prosecutors to fear it, but not so 
significant that courts will treat it as the functional equivalent of a reversal or 
dismissal (and thus be unwilling to grant it).  This task might require some trial 
and error.135  Leaving the magnitude of the reduction up to the appeals court 
would presumably take care of the second concern, but it is not clear whether it 
would result in reductions so small that their deterrent effect would be less than 
the current system.  That result would be less likely if prosecutors are substan-
tially motivated by fear of professional embarrassment—any reduction would 
                                                 
129 Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking By Prosecutors, 73 JUDICATURE 335, 335 (1990); 
Fisher, supra, at 245-46 & n.197. 
130 Bowman & Heise, supra, at 1049-50, 1131-33 (2001). 
131 Fisher, supra, at 198-200 (collecting cites); Dunahoe, supra, at 68. 
132 Conviction rates are probably the most basic measurement of prosecutorial perfor-
mance.  E.g., Catherine M. Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and Public 
Accountability: The Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor, at 10, available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/publications/community_prosecution.pdf; Hyl-
ton & Khanna supra, at 85; Thompson, supra, at 331. 
133 See Cicchini, supra, at 336 (arguing that retrials greatly reduce the deterrent effect of 
reversal).  Where charge-bargaining is permitted, the parties may respond to reversal by 
bargaining for a plea to a charge carrying a lesser sentence.  See Posner, supra, at 644.  
Sentence reduction could be worse than reversal for the prosecutor if its magnitude exceeds 
the reduction the prosecutor would have to offer to get the defendant to accept a plea.   
134 Richman & Stuntz, supra, at 608. 
135 Neither legislatures nor courts will likely be able to predict precisely what level of re-
duction will have the ideal deterrent effect.  But that problem is not unique to sentence re-
duction; similar uncertainty plagues all deterrent remedies in constitutional law.  Meltzer, 
supra, at 290-91; see Dan Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
413, 427-28 (1999). 
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be enough to call attention to the underlying misconduct. In any event, if there 
is truth to the apparent scholarly consensus that the current remedies for prose-
cutorial misconduct are largely devoid of deterrent effect, it may be time to 
take a chance on an alternative.136 
IV. Sentence Reduction as a Corrective and Expressive Remedy  
Constitutional remedies are not solely designed to deter misconduct, of 
course.  Many are designed to compensate victims of rights violations or to ex-
press condemnation of wrongdoing.  This Part discusses those remedial pur-
poses in Sections A and B, respectively, and then argues in Sections C and D 
that all-or-nothing remedies for prosecutorial misconduct do not serve those 
purposes well and that sentence reduction could serve them better.   
Obviously, if sentence reduction is much likelier to be granted, it may 
serve all remedial purposes better than current remedies do.  But even assum-
ing the remedies were equally likely to be granted, sentence reduction may ac-
tually serve corrective and expressive objectives better than all-or-nothing re-
medies do.  It can be tailored to the magnitude of the harm suffered, offering 
more precision in compensating the defendant and making it less likely that the 
expressive message will be clouded by the perception of a windfall. 
A. Criminal Procedure Remedies as Corrective Justice 
At least since Marbury v. Madison,137 U.S. constitutional law has en-
compassed the oft-invoked maxim that “there is no right without a remedy.”  
Constitutional remedies have traditionally sought to repair the impact of the 
violation “to the greatest possible degree”—that is, to make the defendant 
whole.138  This idea, which is a form of “corrective justice,” has also played a 
central role in private law—although modern scholarship emphasizes efficien-
cy concerns,139 courts have traditionally designed private law remedies to re-
                                                 
136 Tracey Meares has offered an interesting proposal to make prosecutors’ bonuses contin-
gent on not having had an appeals court identify misconduct.  Meares, supra, at 902.  The 
proposal has the advantage that—like mine—it would penalize prosecutors for serious mis-
conduct even if “harmless.”  See id. at 914.  But it would work better combined with sen-
tence reduction.  In harmless error cases, sentence reduction would give defendants a more 
concrete incentive to raise claims; under Meares’ scheme alone, their only incentive would 
be a possible desire to hurt the prosecutor.  In other cases, providing a lesser remedy would 
make courts more willing to identify prosecutorial misconduct; Meares’ scheme, while 
adding extra punishment for prosecutors when courts do find misconduct, does not solve 
the remedial deterrence problems that make such findings unlikely. 
137 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
138 Davis v. Board of School Comm’rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1979); see Abram Chayes, The 
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1976); Kent 
Roach, The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in Constitutional Re-
medies, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 859, 868-69 (1991); Meltzer, supra, at 249. 
139 E.g., Jules Coleman, The Costs of the Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 337, 348-54 
(2005) (describing and critiquing this shift away from corrective justice). 
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store the plaintiff to her “rightful position.”140  It is deeply rooted in the English 
common law141 and in legal systems throughout the world.142  This principle is 
not without exceptions,143 and constitutional remedies, like private law reme-
dies, serve other purposes as well.144  Still, corrective justice remains important 
in shaping constitutional remedies and as a norm of our legal culture.145   
In criminal cases involving defensive invocation of procedural rights, 
courts tend to be less explicit in invoking the “make-whole” principle than they 
are in civil lawsuits.  And courts sometimes eschew corrective rationales for 
remedies.  For instance, the Supreme Court has usually sought to justify the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in deterrence terms alone.146  
Nonetheless, corrective justice is one of the primary purposes of many 
criminal procedure remedies.  The logic of the harmless error rule is grounded 
in this principle: if there is no harm of wrongful conviction to be corrected, 
there is no justification for a remedy.  Likewise, where the Supreme Court has 
declined to apply harmless error review, it has sometimes been on the ground 
that some non-conviction-related harm needed to be redressed.  For instance, in 
Speedy Trial Clause cases, the Supreme Court has held (wrongly, in my view) 
that only dismissal with prejudice can effectively compensate the defendant for 
the emotional harm suffered due to the delay in trial.147 
Moreover, criminal procedure scholars often invoke corrective justice 
principles when criticizing current doctrine.  For instance, defenders of the ex-
clusionary rule often criticize the Supreme Court’s reliance on deterrence to 
justify it, arguing that courts can too easily chip away at the rule by claiming 
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that a particular application has little marginal deterrent value.148  They contend 
that the rule should instead be justified on corrective grounds: the injury done 
by the unlawful search must be corrected by refusal to admit the resulting evi-
dence.149 As the case studies in Part V will illustrate, inconsistency with the 
corrective principle—lack of fit between wrong and remedy—likewise under-
lies many criticisms of current remedies for prosecutorial misconduct.150  
B. Expressive Theories of Remedies 
Scholars arguing for strong remedies for prosecutorial misconduct of-
ten cite the need to “send the prosecutor a message.”151 These arguments go 
beyond deterrence—the desired message is not just about the consequences 
that misconduct will trigger, but also about that conduct’s wrongfulness.  These 
remedial arguments are expressive in nature. 
Expressive theories of law recognize that what the law means is often 
as important to us as what it does.  Advocates of expressive theories sometimes 
cite the “intrinsic” value of expressing morally sound judgments, “connected 
with the individual interest in integrity.”152  More often, expressive theories are 
framed in consequentialist terms: when the law expresses morally sound judg-
ments, it encourages people to act consistently with those judgments.153  Such 
arguments share with deterrence arguments a primary concern with shaping 
behavior—but they suggest that law impacts behavior not just by making 
people fear specific penalties, but by shaping social norms.154 
Expressive theories of law are concerned with using the law to counter 
“expressive harms.”  They are premised on the idea that wrongful conduct can 
do harm because of what it means—often, because it conveys a lack of respect 
for another individual’s dignity or humanity.155  As Elizabeth Anderson and 
Richard Pildes point out, for instance, the harm you experience when your 
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neighbor knowingly dumps trash on your lawn is quite different from the harm 
you experience when the wind blows the same trash there.156  The burden of 
picking it up is the same, and relatively minor, but in the former case it is great-
ly magnified by the feeling of having been treated with contempt.  Government 
actions can likewise inflict expressive harms—indeed, “[o]ften it seems to mat-
ter more to individuals what the government says than what other private actors 
say.”157  Such expressive harms go beyond the particular individuals directly 
affected, because of “the way in which they undermine collective understand-
ings.”158   
One objective of legal remedies is to combat these kinds of expressive 
harms, to respond to wrongful message with a better message.159  As Anderson 
and Pildes put it, “‘expressive legal remedies’ matter because they express rec-
ognition of injury and reaffirmation of the underlying normative principles for 
how the relevant relationships are to be constituted.”160 
Criminal procedure remedies can serve similar expressive purposes.  
When prosecutors or police disregard individual rights, they do expressive 
harm—they send “demeaning messages about human worth.”161  They do so 
even if the misconduct is meant to be kept secret, for expressive harms are not 
confined to acts that are deliberately communicative—just as your hypothetical 
trash-throwing neighbor’s rudeness would unmistakably express contempt to-
ward you even if she didn’t know you were watching her.162  Such expressive 
harms can be met with expressive remedies.  For instance, Lawrence Friedman 
argues that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule “serves to vindicate pub-
licly the search victim’s privacy interest: it represents the means by which the 
community, speaking through the judiciary, answers the government’s incor-
rect valuation of privacy.”163 
Corrective and expressive justifications for criminal procedure reme-
dies are closely intertwined.  An appropriate expressive remedy for prosecu-
torial misconduct would counteract the expressive harm done by the prosecu-
tor’s failure to give appropriate value to the defendant—by her disregard of the 
defendant’s humanity, her willingness to strip away his dignity and the rights 
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that belong to him as a full member of the community.  The remedy would 
seek to restore that full humanity—to “make the defendant whole.” In a culture 
that gives pride of place to the Marbury principle, the most effective expressive 
remedy will often be a corrective one, because culturally we understand such 
remedies to “restore” victims of wrongdoing to their “rightful positions.”164  
Likewise, arguments for corrective justice themselves sometimes sound in ex-
pressive terms—for instance, Margaret Jane Radin argues that “corrective jus-
tice restores moral balance between the parties” and “show[s] the victim that 
her rights are taken seriously.”165 
  Expressive remedies are thus usually ineffective if they are merely ex-
pressive, for instance declaratory relief or simple judicial recognition and con-
demnation of wrongdoing.  Remedies that diverge from the corrective principle 
may sometimes still be expressively valuable—as Anderson and Pildes point 
out, for instance, landowners subject to state takings often prefer “token com-
pensation” to no compensation, while victims of constitutional wrongs often 
take even nominal damages seriously.166  But usually, at least some concrete 
relief is necessary for the expressive message to be taken seriously.  As Fried-
man argues regarding the exclusionary rule,  
proper vindication of an individual’s privacy interest . . . re-
quires that the search victim be returned to the approximate po-
sition in relation to the government that she occupied before the 
illegal search or seizure. . . . Absent that realignment of inter-
ests, the judicial declaration of the expressive harm and reaf-
firmation of the proper relationship between individuals and the 
government would ring hollow.167 
Similarly, Jean Hampton argues that actions that degrade another person take 
“more than a few remarks to deny. . . . [Instead,] we are morally required to 
respond by trying to remake the world in a way that denies what the wrong-
doer's events have attempted to establish, thereby lowering the wrongdoer, ele-
vating the victim, and annulling the act of diminishment.”168 
In addition to recognizing the dignity and humanity of the wronged par-
ty, legal remedies can thus also serve a second expressive purpose: condemning 
wrongdoing.  Expressive theories of law have often focused on the power of 
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the law to shape social norms by marshaling social opprobrium.  In an influen-
tial essay, for instance, Joel Feinberg argued that criminal punishment should 
express “attitudes of resentment and indignation.”169  Likewise, Paul Robinson 
and John Darley have argued that “social science research consistently finds 
that fear of social disapproval and moral commitment to the law both inhibit 
the commission of illegal activity. . . The prosecution of a deviant brands the 
deviant as a criminal and casts a bright light on the exact location of a boun-
dary that previously might have been obscure to the community.”170  Expres-
sions of condemnation thus speak to a broader audience than the parties to the 
case.  But they also can induce shame in the wrongdoer herself, and indeed, 
this shame can be a crucial aspect of the punishment.171 
Scholars advancing condemnation-centered expressive theories have 
mainly focused on criminal punishment.  But legal remedies for other kinds of 
wrongs can also be understood to serve the purpose of condemnation.  Indeed, 
remedies awarded to criminal defendants are often described as “sanctions” for 
prosecutorial misconduct.172  To be sure, they do not “punish” the individual 
prosecutor in the traditional legal sense of the word—the defendant, not the 
prosecutor, is the direct object of the remedy, one might say.  But they often 
share something important in common with punishment: the intent to condemn 
or blame.173  And the judicial condemnation accompanying such remedies may 
publicly embarrass the prosecutor in a way that affects her more than the reme-
dies alone would.174 
The two expressive purposes I have discussed here are distinct, al-
though intertwined. The defendant-centered expressive purpose is essentially 
corrective—it focuses on making the defendant whole for the expressive harms 
he has suffered.  The prosecutor-centered purpose is essentially retributive.175   
The remedial implications will sometimes differ, particularly when the prose-
cutor’s wrongdoing was egregious but the expressive harm experienced by the 
defendant was minor.  This point is further discussed in the next two sections. 
C. The Windfall Problem 
 Both the corrective and the expressive purposes of criminal procedure 
remedies risk being undermined by excessive remedies—windfalls—just as 
they are undermined by absent ones.  Strong remedies like reversal or dismissal 
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are probably essential in some cases to respond to misconduct.  But in other 
cases, they may be counterproductive.  
The harm of windfalls is easy to understand in corrective terms: they 
overcorrect, and thus restore the defendant not to his rightful position, but to a 
superior position.   Because the corrective justice principle treats restoration of 
the status quo ante as the moral ideal, overcorrection is as problematic as un-
dercorrection.176 But the harm of windfalls in expressive terms is less obvious: 
if we want to condemn conduct, why is a more vociferous condemnation not 
always better?   
The answer lies in the centrality of desert to expressive theories of law, 
and is closely related to the widespread cultural acceptance of the corrective 
justice principle.  As scholars have recognized, the expressive value of law 
turns on its perceived moral legitimacy.177  If the law is not culturally unders-
tood as legitimate, then it lacks value as an expressive medium and cannot ef-
fectively shape social norms.  One important factor in determining legitimacy 
is that the law does not diverge too greatly from cultural intuitions concerning 
fairness.  These intuitions include the notion that remedies and punishments 
should be apportioned, at least roughly, only as deserved. 
 Windfall remedies threaten this desert principle in two ways.  First, be-
cause they go beyond the requirements of corrective justice, they may be per-
ceived178 as giving the defendant more than he deserves.  Rather than sending a 
positive message restoring respect for the defendant’s dignity and humanity, 
the remedy may just provoke resentment.179  
Second, proportionality and desert also matter to the effectiveness of 
condemnation as well.  If remedies are perceived as disproportionate to the 
wrongdoing that they are intended to condemn, they may be seen as retributive-
ly unjustified.   This is especially true when similar prosecutorial misconduct 
usually meets with no remedy at all.  If the unlucky few prosecutors are not 
perceived as “deserving” the loss inflicted by those remedies, the desired stig-
ma may be lost.  As Stephen Schulhofer argues with respect to disparately dis-
tributed criminal punishment: 
[D]esert is a vital component of an efficient sanctioning system 
because desert is essential to the stigmatizing effects of pu-
nishment. . . .[R]andomly punishing only one in ten robbers 
would seriously undermine that requirement. . . [T]he sanction-
ing effect of stigma tends to vanish, to the extent that a severe 
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punishment brands the tenth robber not as an extraordinarily 
bad person but only as an extraordinarily unlucky one.180 
Robinson and Darley have likewise argued that punishment cannot ef-
fectively shape social norms if it is seen as arbitrary or undeserved.  Indeed, 
because “the criminal law’s most important real-world effect may be its abili-
ty” to shape social norms, excessive punishment may have a net negative effect 
on compliance with law—the marginal deterrent benefit “is outweighed by the 
additional cost” to the “law’s moral credibility.”181  
Although these arguments focus on criminal punishment,182 their logic 
may well apply to the use of windfall remedies to condemn prosecutors.183  The 
effectiveness of those remedies’ message may be undermined by the perception 
that the condemnation goes beyond what is deserved.184  
All-or-nothing remedies for misconduct thus often pose a choice be-
tween two unsatisfactory alternatives.  Granting the defendant a remedy pro-
duces a windfall that is excessive from a corrective perspective and unsatisfac-
tory from an expressive perspective.  But denying a remedy fails to correct the 
harm that the defendant did suffer, and sends the equally unacceptable message 
that the court tolerates the misconduct.185  
D.  Sentence Reduction as a Tailored Remedy 
To resolve the dilemmas posed by all-or-nothing remedial choices, it 
may be necessary to find an alternative that is less of a blunt instrument.  Sen-
tence reduction is one possibility.  Because a sentence reduction could be of 
any magnitude—from a nominal reduction to the entire length of the base sen-
tence—it can be tailored either to the wrongfulness of the prosecutor’s miscon-
duct or to the harm inflicted on the defendant.   It thus could potentially be 
more satisfying in terms of desert: a fair remedy for the defendant and a fair 
form of condemnation for the prosecution.  And for this reason, it could be 
more effective in expressing a message condemning misconduct—serious 
enough to convey that message’s seriousness, but not so excessive as to merely 
engender resentment. 
                                                 
180 Schulhofer, supra, at 68. 
181 Robinson & Darley, supra, at 457-58; see id. at 478; cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 308-09 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that the death penalty’s retributive 
value was deeply undermined by its rarity and apparent capriciousness). 
182 See Robinson & Darley, supra, at 480 (noting that “[m]uch of civil law is governed by 
principles unrelated to desert”). 
183 Cf. White, supra, at 1279-80 (arguing that perceived excessive size of punitive damage 
verdicts undermines their expressive message). 
184 Although it has not framed its arguments in expressive terms, in the Fourth Amendment 
context the Supreme Court has demonstrated discomfort with remedies that over-punish—
it has refused to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence if doing so would “put the 
police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.”  Nix 
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (adopting the “inevitable discovery” exception). 
185 See Henning, supra, at 717. 
SENTENCE REDUCTION AS A REMEDY FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 33
 It is easier to see how this might work in some contexts than others.  In 
speedy trial cases, for instance, where a defendant has suffered years of serious 
stress but has ultimately been fairly convicted, a relatively significant sentence 
reduction might easily be justified in corrective terms. Such a remedy would 
also serve the expressive purpose of condemning the prosecutor’s misconduct.  
But complications arise when the harm experienced by the defendant seems 
quite minor, but the wrongdoing by the prosecutor seems to merit an expressive 
remedy with some teeth.  If sentence reduction is to be justified as an expres-
sive remedy in such cases, it will have to be solely in terms of its value in con-
demning the prosecutor’s conduct.   
In such cases, sentence reduction is more likely to succeed in express-
ing condemnation if the windfall to the defendant at is not dramatically exces-
sive relative to the magnitude of the prosecutor’s misconduct. That is, the mes-
sage’s audience is likelier to tolerate a windfall that is unjustified in corrective 
terms—and thus to accept the message as morally legitimate—if the remedy 
satisfies the principle of desert in the retributive sense.  The remedy must there-
fore be tailored to the wrong. 
But what would it mean to tailor a sentence reduction to the magnitude 
of the wrong, or for that matter to the magnitude of the harm caused?  One po-
tential objection is that of incommensurability.  It is difficult to define and 
quantify the harm done by prosecutorial misconduct when unrelated to the 
conviction.  Translating that harm into a number of years’ reduction may be 
even more difficult.  How many years off a sentence is a seven-year delay in 
trial “worth,” for instance?  Similar questions arise if the magnitude is tailored 
to the magnitude of the wrongdoing, rather than to the harm suffered. 
 A related objection concerns commodification: does sentence reduction 
send the message that prosecutors can go ahead and violate defendants’ rights, 
so long as they are willing to pay a price?  Does even trying to quantify the 
harm done by such violations inherently treat those rights as commodities, or at 
least, as mere interests that legitimately can be traded off against other inter-
ests?  If so, then the expressive message of sentence reduction could be 
clouded or even counterproductive.  Pricing, scholars have sometimes argued 
in other contexts, can reduce the stigma that attaches to bad acts—it treats them 
not as wrongdoing but as costs of doing business.186 
These objections are serious, yet I do not think either provides suffi-
cient reason to reject sentence reduction as a remedy.  First, it would be incon-
gruous to reject sentence reduction for these reasons when our legal system 
embraces money damages as a compensatory remedy for non-monetary injuries 
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including constitutional violations.  Such remedies are equally plagued by 
commensurability problems187 and seem to “price” violations in expressly 
monetary terms, the same way goods are valued in market exchanges.188   
Indeed, sentence reduction may be less susceptible to commodification 
and commensurability objections than damages are.  The remedy and its costs 
to the prosecution (or the “people”) cut directly against the benefits the prose-
cution (acting on behalf of the “people”) sought to gain through the miscon-
duct.  It restores some of the liberty that the prosecution sought to take away.189  
If government actors do not usually violate constitutional rights for the purpose 
of adding money to the public fisc, then damage awards do not offer this same 
correspondence.190  
 Damages, of course, are a time-honored way of redressing apparently 
unquantifiable harms—they are deeply embedded in our legal culture, which 
helps to lend them the moral legitimacy they need to serve as effective expres-
sive remedies despite incommensurability concerns.  And it may be coherent 
after all to ask what an injury is “worth” in dollars—you can always ask your-
self what you would have to be paid to agree to suffer it.   Likewise, we can 
coherently talk about money damages in essentially punitive terms—that is, we 
can talk about their value in expressing moral condemnation. Plaintiffs’ law-
yers routinely ask juries to use high punitive damage awards to “send a mes-
sage” to the defendant,191 and fines may also be imposed as criminal punish-
ment.  It is the surrounding culture that gives those remedies their meaning—if 
we treat them as condemnatory acts, they are not merely “prices.”192 
Analogous observations, however, apply to sentence reduction.  Using 
years of liberty to “quantify” harm or moral wrongfulness is just as familiar to 
our legal culture as are money damages: liberty is the currency of the criminal 
law.  Courts and juries, or legislatures under modern determinate sentencing 
schemes, routinely quantify how “bad” conduct is in terms of the liberty of the 
person who commits it.  The incommensurability problem is no more serious 
when the liberty in question is that of the victim of misconduct rather than that 
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of the person committing it.  It is perfectly coherent, for instance, to ask your-
self how many months or years of your liberty you would give up to avoid a 
particular rights violation. Such an inquiry may put a “price” on your rights, 
but no more than criminal punishment itself puts a price on crime victims’ 
rights.  Few contend that we should stop punishing crimes—or punish them all 
with the death penalty—for this reason.  
 By issuing a sentence reduction, a court would thus measure its re-
sponse to prosecutorial misconduct in the same currency used to punish the 
defendant’s underlying crime: years of the defendant’s liberty.  This, in and of 
itself, might amount to an important expressive signal—it treats prosecutorial 
misconduct as fundamentally comparable to crime itself, and worthy of moral 
condemnation in the same sense that crime is.193  It seeks to quantify wrongful-
ness and harm, but in terms that we usually associate with condemnation, not 
with market transactions.  As Canadian scholar Alan Manson has argued: 
 [Sentencing] is the aspect [of the criminal process] which is 
most readily and widely communicated to members of the 
community. . . . The accused's blameworthiness usually occu-
pies the sentencing judge's message but this is only part of the 
larger message about community norms and values. A message 
about the values which underlie Charter guarantees . . .  may 
equally be relevant.194 
A possible countervailing concern is that this perceived parallel treat-
ment of the crime and the rights violation might muddle the expressive mes-
sage (and the deterrent impact) of criminal punishment itself, and might en-
gender resentment, particularly among crime victims.  Such concerns have 
been alluded to in at least two Canadian court decisions.195  But as Oren Bick 
argues in his discussion of those decisions, it should be fairly easy for judges 
“to make it plain . . . that the ‘discount’ does not stem from reduced culpability, 
and cannot be expected in the future, by the offender or by others.”196  Bick 
asserts that courts will only be able to draw this distinction if they follow the 
                                                 
193 Cf. Robinson & Darley, supra, at 480 (discussing the unique power of criminal punish-
ment to condemn). 
194 Allan Manson, Charter Violations in Mitigation of Sentence, 41 C.R. (4th) 318, 323 
(1995). 
195 In R. v. Carpenter, the British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected a sentence reduction 
in part because of its “potential for mixed messages.”  2002 CarswellBC 1057, para. 26. 
That case involved a “non-serious” Charter violation, however—the court emphasized that 
the “message . . . about the seriousness of the appellant’s crime . . . would be substantially 
undermined” by treating it as comparable to “non-serious” misconduct.  Id. at para. 27.  In 
R. v. Glykis, 100 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. 1995), the Ontario Court of Appeal cited a similar 
concern. It suggested, however, that sentence reduction could be appropriate where the 
violation had inflicted some “punishment or added hardship” that could legitimately be 
offset against the sentence.  Id; see Bick, supra, at 211, 219-22 (arguing in favor of this 
“punishment or hardship” restriction); Manson, supra (criticizing this restriction). 
196 Bick, supra, at 224-25. 
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rule he proposes confining sentence reduction to situations where it truly “cor-
rects” a hardship to the defendant,197 but it is hard to see why.  Even when sen-
tence reductions go beyond what is correctively justified, on expressive or de-
terrent grounds, it should still be possible for courts to emphasize that the re-
duction is a response to prosecutorial misconduct alone and not the defendant’s 
culpability.   Court decisions routinely encompass more than one message, and 
there is no reason the messages need get mixed. 
In addition, there is nothing new about weighing competing values 
against the value of vindicating crime victims’ interests (or, for that matter, 
against the value of deterring crimes or incapacitating criminals198).  Existing 
sentencing schemes do not base punishment solely on the harm done by the 
crime.  Sentences are also based on the defendant’s individual history, and may 
be reduced for reasons quite unrelated to the crime—for instance, the “substan-
tial assistance” a defendant happens to be able to give the government in 
another case.  Indeed, sentences are often reduced or suspended due to prison 
overcrowding—an unfortunate reason, but one that reflects the fact that the 
criminal justice system routinely trades off the value of achieving the “right” 
punishment against other legitimate social interests.199 
Moreover, existing windfall remedies for procedural violations more 
dramatically sacrifice crime victims’ interests.  Sentence reduction at least can 
be tailored to serve the objective of proportionality relative to the defendant’s 
sentence.  The higher the base sentence, the smaller an equal-size reduction 
will be relative to that sentence—in contrast to reversal or dismissal remedies, 
which amount to bigger windfalls the more serious the underlying crime.  This 
approach would help to minimize the appearance that the defendant’s crimes 
are not being treated with appropriate seriousness, or that victims’ interests are 
being disregarded. 
Finally, there is also nothing new, or necessarily objectionable, about 
the criminal justice system metaphorically “pricing” defendants’ rights.  In-
                                                 
197 Id. 
198 A related objection is that reducing the sentence could undermine the goals of deter-
rence or incapacitation.  As to deterrence, the concern seems insubstantial: it is quite un-
likely that any particular potential offender would be appreciably influenced by what re-
medial scheme would be in effect in the unlikely event that his case goes to trial and results 
in prosecutorial misconduct that is later detected.   
The incapacitation concern is more serious.  Where a very long sentence is truly 
necessary for incapacitation of a dangerous defendant, I agree with Bick that it “could fair-
ly be asked: can we instead choose a remedy that does not put the public at risk?” Id. at 
225.  A sentence reduction scheme could provide exceptions for such circumstances.  But I 
also agree with Bick that for most sentences, incapacitation concerns provide no serious 
basis for objection to marginal reductions.  Generally, if the public will not be endangered 
by the defendant’s release after thirteen years, it probably won’t be endangered after ten—
or at least, the marginal increase in risk will not be so much that it cannot be outweighed by 
competing considerations.  See id. 
199 See M.C.L.A. 801.57 (ordering reduction of all prisoners’ sentences in response to over-
crowding); Jack Leonard & Doug Smith, Hilton Will Do More Time Than Most, Analysis 
Finds, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2007, p. A-1 (discussing California early release program). 
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deed, nearly all such rights are routinely “priced” by the plea bargaining sys-
tem, which allows defendants to trade them for reduced charges or sentencing 
recommendations.200  Plea bargaining essentially treats those rights as property 
that can be traded at prices the parties choose; law-and-economics scholars 
have not had to stretch to describe this process in market terms.201  Likewise, 
the current remedial schemes for rights violations can be similarly described.  
Some remedial rules are premised expressly on deterrence concerns—courts 
already talk explicitly about the need to set a price for the violation.  And for 
rights subject to the harmless error rule, the current price of violation is simply 
zero, except in the very unlikely event that the court finds prejudice.  Com-
pared to this approach, sentence reduction hardly devalues rights.202 
 I do not mean to trivialize the difficulty of translating “badness” of 
misconduct into sentence-reduction-years.  Indeed, this difficulty may intro-
duce a new source of potentially arbitrary variation in sentencing, as different 
judges may disagree as to how much of a reduction particular misconduct is 
“worth.”203  Such variation may affect the expressive effectiveness of the re-
medy by interfering with the perception that the remedies are deserved.  More-
over, the variations may not be randomly distributed—like any source of sen-
tencing discretion, allowing judges to tailor sentence reductions risks introduc-
ing racial disparities.204   
These problems could be alleviated considerably if the magnitude of 
the sentence reduction were fixed by statute.  That approach may, in fact, be 
                                                 
200 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 
670-80 (1981) (arguing that plea bargaining commodifies rights); cf. Stephanos Bibas, 
Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1361, 1407 (2003) (arguing that Alford and nolo contendere pleas treat punishment 
“as a marketable good, undermining its moral authority”). 
201 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra. 
202 See Jedediah Purdy, The Promise (and Limits) of Neuroeconomics, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1, 
32 (2006) (suggesting that “in practice when things have no price, we treat them not as 
priceless but as worthless”). Gneezy and Rustichini’s day care study, supra note 186, does 
suggest that leaving violations unpunished might be better than imposing fines in terms of 
social stigma.  But that study involved an extremely small fine—about US$3.68, far less 
than other publicly assessed fines in Israel.  Id. at 4-5.  The upshot may simply be that tri-
vial “prices” are worse than nothing—they imply that the norm is not serious. 
203 Similar translation problems infect jury awards of punitive damages, see, e.g., Daniel 
Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage, Erratic Awards, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES 
DECIDE 31, 34-36, 40-41 (Sunstein et al. eds., 2002) (finding that mock juries are consistent 
in assessing wrongfulness, but wildly inconsistent in translating wrongfulness into dollar 
figures), and there is no reason to assume judges are immune from such difficulties, see W. 
Kip Viscusi, Do Judges Do Better?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra, at 186, 206.  Indeed, 
traditional discretionary sentencing resulted in wide disparities, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 
HOFSTRA L REV. 1, 4 (1988), suggesting difficulty translating crime wrongfulness into sen-
tence-years. 
204 See, e.g., William W. Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton, and John R. Steer, The Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 CRIM L. F. 355, 359-62 (1991) (citing studies of pre-Guidelines sen-
tencing disparity). 
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the best option, although it would reduce the remedy’s advantage in terms of 
tailorability.  A legislatively specified reduction need not be completely one-
size-fits all.  Rather, it could at least achieve some degree of nuance by specify-
ing different reductions for different kinds of violations and prosecutorial men-
tal states.205  Inevitably, though, there is bound to be some degree of tradeoff 
between permitting appropriate tailoring and reducing disparities—a tradeoff 
that is familiar to sentencing policy more generally. 
In any event, however, even if a sentence reduction scheme permitted 
complete judicial discretion as to the magnitude of the reduction, it would be 
hard to imagine it producing more arbitrary variations in treatment than those 
produced by current all-or-nothing remedies.  Under those schemes, a few de-
fendants enjoy windfalls while most get nothing at all—and there is no sharp 
break between the situations of the lucky and unlucky ones that justifies such 
dramatic disparities.206  That would be a problem even if all judges drew the 
line between “all” and “nothing” at exactly the same place, but given the inhe-
rent subjectivity of the task, it would be astonishing if they did.   
In sum, a remedial scheme that includes sentence reduction as an in-
termediate alternative would serve corrective and expressive purposes better 
than the current “stronger” remedies do—even if both schemes faced equal re-
medial deterrence problems.  That advantage is compounded by the fact that 
courts will in fact probably be more willing to grant sentence reduction, in part 
because of the very corrective and expressive advantages discussed here: 
judges, like people generally, can be expected to resist remedies that go beyond 
what they see as deserved.  Remedies that are perceived as fairer are thus not 
only likely to be more effective in condemning misconduct and restoring re-
spect for defendants’ rights, but also likelier to be granted in the first place. 
V. Applications 
This Part explores in greater detail several potential applications of the 
sentence reduction remedy. Sections A and B consider misconduct that current-
ly triggers automatic remedies not subject to harmless error review: speedy trial 
violations and race discrimination in jury selection.  Section C considers se-
rious prosecutorial misconduct that is subject to harmless error review—for 
instance, failure to disclose exculpatory evidence or flagrantly inflammatory 
courtroom comments.   
The current remedies for each of these kinds of misconduct have been 
subject to vigorous scholarly debate.  Here, I explain how sentence reduction 
                                                 
205 Such an approach would bear some resemblance to sentencing guidelines schemes 
themselves, sharing their objective of balancing individualization and equal treatment. See 
Adam Lamparello, Introducing the “Heartland Departure,” 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
643, 668 (2004); Breyer, supra, at 4.  
206 Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky et al., Of Equal Wrongs and Half Wrights, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
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could address the major problems identified by detractors of each remedial 
scheme, without encountering the pitfalls presented by other reform proposals. 
A. Speedy Trial Violations 
The Supreme Court has addressed the possibility of sentence reduction as a 
criminal procedure remedy in a single context: the Speedy Trial Clause.  The 
Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants’ right to a “speedy . . . trial,” 
and the traditional remedy for violations has been dismissal of charges with 
prejudice.  In Barker v. Wingo, the Court noted that the traditional dismissal 
remedy is sometimes “unsatisfactorily severe” because “a defendant who may 
be guilty of a serious crime will go free.”207  Nonetheless, it concluded without 
further explanation that dismissal is the “only possible remedy.”208   
One year later, in Strunk v. United States, the Court was presented with a 
challenge to this conclusion.  The Seventh Circuit, which decided the case two 
months after Barker, had found a speedy trial violation, and notwithstanding 
Barker’s holding, had ordered a sentence reduction as a remedy.209  It reasoned 
that the “severity” of the dismissal remedy “has caused courts to be extremely 
hesitant in finding a failure to afford a speedy trial. . . . [W]e know of no reason 
why less drastic relief may not be granted in appropriate cases.”210 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  This was an unsurprising re-
sult, given the court of appeals’ disregard of its clear holding in Barker.  For 
this reason perhaps, the Court offered little reasoning for why the court of ap-
peals’ remedy was constitutionally insufficient, stating merely:  
The speedy trial guarantee recognizes that a prolonged delay may sub-
ject the accused to an emotional stress. . . . [O]ther factors such as the 
prospect of rehabilitation may also be affected adversely [by this 
stress]. The remedy chosen by the Court of Appeals does not deal with 
these difficulties. 
The Court gave no reason for this final conclusion, and it is hard to think of 
one.  Of course sentence reduction could not eliminate the emotional stress that 
the defendant suffered while awaiting trial.  But neither could any appellate 
remedy—including dismissal—as that stress was past.  The defendant was 
seeking a remedy to compensate him for harm already done.  Sentence reduc-
tion could serve that compensatory purpose.  Indeed, dismissal itself (when 
granted on appeal for speedy trial violations not affecting the verdict, as in 
Strunk) is also a compensatory remedy—only a disproportionate one. 
 As critics of the dismissal remedy—most prominently, Anthony Ams-
terdam and Akhil Amar—have pointed out, dismissal is really only necessary 
when delays have rendered it impossible to provide the defendant a fair trial, 
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perhaps because evidence has become unavailable.211  But this is not always 
the case, and the other interests protected by the Speedy Trial Clause—
“avoiding prolonged pretrial detention [and] minimizing the anxiety and loss of 
reputation accompanying public accusation”212—can be protected in other 
ways.  If speedy trial claims are raised in an interlocutory posture, the court can 
take measures to expedite the process, including ordering the prosecutor to 
stand ready for trial; it can also release the defendant from pretrial detention. 
When such claims are raised on appeal or not raised pretrial until significant 
harm has already been suffered, dismissal is not the only way to compensate 
the defendant for the stress and reputational harms suffered.  In cases in which 
the fairness of the trial was not affected by the delay, dismissal provides an un-
necessary windfall to guilty defendants, who escape punishment entirely, and 
disserves crime victims and society.213   
Nor is dismissal necessary to deter or condemn prosecutorial foot-
dragging effectively.  Indeed, because of remedial deterrence, automatic dis-
missal may undermine both goals.  And its expressive value is further under-
mined by the windfall problem. 
A better approach is to allow courts the option of sentence reduction in 
cases where the verdict is unaffected by the delay.  Because courts would be 
willing to invoke it, this remedy would be a more effective deterrent.  And the 
windfall problem is much less severe.  The reduction might amount to some 
degree of windfall, but it would be comparatively small and could be justified 
as the cost of encouraging respect for constitutional rights. The court of appeals 
in Strunk may thus have picked the right remedy, albeit one that was unlikely 
to be upheld in light of conflicting Supreme Court precedent. 
Oddly, despite Strunk, scholars criticizing the dismissal remedy have 
not focused on sentence reduction as an alternative.214  Most have instead em-
phasized the above-mentioned interlocutory remedies,215 which are fine as far 
as they go, but are solely oriented toward cessation of ongoing violations. They 
thus cannot correct or condemn past violations, nor can they deter effectively, 
because the prosecutor will go unpunished for harm already caused. 
This problem is not solved by Amar’s additional proposal that defen-
dants be permitted to bring suits for money damages for injuries that have al-
                                                 
211 Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 649-58 (1996); 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial, 27 STAN. L. REV. 525, 535-36 (1975); see 
also Note, Dismissal of the Indictment as a Remedy for Denial of the Right to Speedy Trial, 
64 YALE L.J. 1208, 1209 n.9 (1955).  
212 Amar, supra, at 649. 
213 See id. at 646; Amsterdam, supra, at 539. 
214 Amar does note that sentences should be offset “for time served [in pretrial detention] to 
avoid double punishment,” but this is routine (defendants are always credited for time 
served even in the absence of any constitutional violation) rather than being a remedy for a 
violation.  84 GEO. L. J. at 652. 
215 Amsterdam, supra, at 535; Amar, supra, at 649-58; John C. Godbold, Speedy Trial—
Major Surgery for a National Ill, 24 ALA. L. REV. 265, 289-93 (1972); Erik G. Luna, The 
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ready occurred.216  While damages may be the best way to compensate acquit-
ted defendants,217 they provide little recourse for convicted defendants, who are 
unlikely to win civil suits and have little incentive even to bring them.218  In-
deed, Amar acknowledges that his scheme would not provide much benefit for 
convicted defendants, and to him this is one of its prime selling points—the 
Sixth Amendment, he argues, is meant to protect the innocent, not to provide 
windfalls for the guilty.219   
Even if so, however, it may be necessary to provide remedies to guilty 
defendants because those remedies’ expressive and deterrent effects benefit the 
innocent.   Amar’s damage remedy fails on both counts. The vast majority of 
criminal cases end in convictions, and Amar’s proposal provides no expressive 
remedy in those cases.  Moreover, a prosecutor, when deciding whether to ex-
pedite her case preparation to avoid a speedy trial violation, would know that it 
was highly likely that the defendant would be convicted and have virtually no 
chance at a damage remedy.  She might rationally choose to roll the dice.   Sen-
tence reduction is thus a better alternative on deterrent and expressive grounds. 
 Although the Supreme Court is unlikely to overrule Strunk, sentence 
reduction could nevertheless be adopted as a remedy in speedy trial cases that 
do not involve violations of the federal Constitution.  Congress could adopt it 
for violations of the Speedy Trial Act220 that do not amount to constitutional 
violations; state courts could adopt it for violations of speedy trial clauses in 
their state constitutions, which are sometimes more expansive than their federal 
equivalent;221 and state legislatures could adopt it for violations of their speedy 
trial statutes, which almost always are more expansive than the Sixth Amend-
ment’s protections.222   
The remedy for these legislative and state constitutional provisions is prob-
ably more important than the Sixth Amendment remedy, because many more 
claims are now brought under them.  As Susan Herman explains, “One impor-
tant reason why the Supreme Court has not decided a constitutional speedy trial 
case since 1992 is undoubtedly that many claims which might otherwise have 
been raised under the Constitution have been superseded by the more specific 
and often more demanding speedy trial standards of an increasingly compre-
hensive set of federal and state rules.”223  States are, of course, free to adopt 
their own remedies for state rights, and the remedies that they have adopted 
                                                 
216 Amar, supra, at 669-76. 
217 The Rwanda Tribunal accordingly generally orders conditional remedies for pretrial 
rights violations: sentence reduction if the defendant is convicted and damages if he is ac-
quitted.  See supra note 6 (citing cases).  
218 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.  
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DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 42
vary, although dismissal is common.224  For federal prisoners, the Speedy Trial 
Act orders a dismissal remedy, although courts have discretion as to whether 
the dismissal is with or without prejudice.225 
B. Race Discrimination in Jury and Jury Venire Selection 
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that Constitution prohibits 
prosecutors from striking jurors from a jury venire on the basis of race.226  Such 
discrimination, the Court held, violated both the juror’s and the defendant’s 
Equal Protection rights, as well as the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
venire composed of a fair cross-section of his peers.  Although the juror’s 
rights are violated, the defendant alone receives the remedy.  In Batson and 
subsequent cases finding similar discrimination, the Supreme Court has always 
reversed the defendant’s conviction without applying harmless error analy-
sis.227  It has thus implied, without ever actually stating, that automatic reversal 
is the appropriate remedy at the appellate stage.   
Although the Court has never explained its remedial choice, it appears to be 
grounded in the violation of the juror’s rights, not the defendant’s.  It has 
granted the same remedy in cases that focused on the juror’s rights alone.  Con-
sider its 1990 decision in Powers v. Ohio.228  That case did not raise a Sixth 
Amendment issue, because it involved the selection of the jury itself, while the 
Court had earlier held that the “fair cross-section” requirement applied only to 
the jury venire.229  Likewise, the Powers Court never resolved the thorny ques-
tion of whether the white defendant’s Equal Protection rights were violated by 
the exclusion of black jurors.  Instead, it focused on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment right of the juror and devoted extensive analysis to the question of wheth-
er the defendant had third-party standing to invoke that right.230  Finding that 
the defendant did have standing and that there was a violation, the Court 
granted reversal.231   
In addition, the automatic reversal remedy appears more logically grounded 
in the juror’s right, because harmless error review is logically inapposite to that 
right.  The juror’s right has nothing to do with the outcome—an excluded juror 
is equally harmed even if the juror who replaced him would have decided the 
case the same way.   In contrast, violations of the defendant’s rights, in prin-
                                                 
224 Id. (discussing the effect of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers).  
225  18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. 
226 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (applying 
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and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, nn.148-49 (1996) (discussing cases). 
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230 499 U.S. 400, 1410-16 (1991).   
231 Id. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (likewise granting reversal in a case with a 
white defendant and no Sixth Amendment claim); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race 
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734-36 (1992). 
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ciple, could be subject to harmless error review. 232 If the evidence for convic-
tion is so overwhelming that any reasonable juror would have convicted, the 
exclusion could be harmless.233 
But using the automatic reversal remedy (in either the venire or jury selec-
tion context) to vindicate the juror’s Equal Protection rights confers a windfall 
on the defendant—the remedy does not match the violation.234 This result, as 
Peter Henning has argued, “does not necessarily vindicate the interests of the 
community” in punishment of crime.235  And as discussed in Part IV, this wind-
fall problem could potentially undermine the expressive and corrective value of 
the reversal remedy. 
 Many scholars have defended the automatic reversal remedy despite 
this windfall, arguing that it is necessary to protect jurors who “have no ability 
to detect and correct violations” themselves by “giving defendants an incen-
tive” to bring violations to light.236  Although jurors themselves receive no re-
medy, the risk of reversal deters prosecutors from violating their rights.237   
These are real advantages, if the reversal remedy is actually imple-
mented effectively—but remedial deterrence presents a serious problem.  The 
                                                 
232 There is a reasonable doctrinal argument that the remedy would be automatic reversal 
for the defendant’s right too, because the violation is “structural”—a “defect affecting the 
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drastic remedy makes judges reluctant to reverse convictions and too willing to 
accept pretextual race-neutral explanations for peremptory strikes.238  If viola-
tions are virtually never found, prosecutors can feel free to discriminate with 
impunity, and jurors remain unprotected.239 
Sentence reduction could help to solve this dilemma.  The arguments 
for an automatic appellate remedy that benefits the defendant do not necessari-
ly require automatic reversal—automatic sentence reduction would carry the 
same benefit of giving defendants the incentive to raise claims.240  Meanwhile, 
while automatic sentence reduction would still be something of a windfall to 
the defendant in harmless error cases, the magnitude of the windfall would be 
much less, making it preferable on expressive and corrective grounds.  
Some defenders of the reversal remedy might raise an expressive objec-
tion, arguing that only reversal can send an unambiguous message condemning 
such discrimination.241  Under this view, sentence reduction would send the 
message that race discrimination is to some degree tolerable.  This objection 
does not persuade me.  To say that reversal is not warranted by a constitutional 
violation is not to say that the violation is acceptable, but rather that reversal is 
not the remedy that best fits the violation in light of other important social val-
ues at stake in the case.242  Moreover, as discussed in Part IV.C, the most dra-
matic remedy is not always the most effective one from an expressive perspec-
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242 Analogously, Muller argues: 
[A] prosecutor's illegal courtroom decision to dismiss a juror on account 
of race or gender should have the same consequences for the defendant 
as that prosecutor’s illegal office decision to fire a secretary on account 
of race or gender. In both instances, the prosecutor has offended deep and 
important equal protection values. But when the appellate court reviews a 
criminal conviction, it does not police those values for their own sake; it 
polices the reliability of the verdict. 
Muller, supra, at 121.   I would not go this far; obviously, I do argue for a remedy to the 
defendant, and I argue that verdict-reliability ought not to be the sole focus of appellate 
courts.  Still, I agree with Muller that rejection of a particular remedy for a constitutional 
violation ought not to be confused with approval of the violation itself. 
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tive.  Resentment of excessive windfalls may cloud the remedial message, 
making a “lesser” remedy a better option. 
Most importantly, sentence reduction could provide an appellate reme-
dy that courts would actually be willing to enforce.  It thus could serve the pur-
poses of the automatic reversal remedy better than that remedy itself does, pro-
viding a greater deterrent of prosecutorial discrimination in jury selection.  Re-
versal could be maintained as an option for those few especially egregious in-
stances in which courts are willing to grant it, which would preserve any ad-
vantages that it offers while allowing for some remedy to be granted when 
courts are unwilling to reverse. 
Some scholars have critiqued courts’ emphasis on the juror’s right, ar-
guing that the defendant’s rights (under either the Sixth Amendment or the 
Equal Protection Clause) are the proper focus.243  If the Batson problem is con-
ceived in terms of the defendant’s rights, sentence reduction would be an unsa-
tisfying remedy in cases in which the violation renders the trial unfair.  I take 
no position as to whether the right is better conceived as belonging to the juror, 
the defendant, or both—I assume the maintenance of current doctrine, under 
which the remedy appears to be justified by the juror’s right.  That said, defen-
dants too might be better off with something less than automatic reversal, be-
cause courts would be more willing to recognize violations.  If the Batson pro-
hibition’s substance is being diluted as a result of its remedy, neither the inter-
ests of defendants nor those of jurors are well served.   
 Sentence reduction could, in any case, play an important role in a re-
medial scheme that addressed both the defendant’s rights and those of the juror, 
provided that violations of the former were subject to harmless error review. 
The scheme would then encompass separate remedies, each less than automatic 
reversal, for each right.  The defendant would get an automatic sentence reduc-
tion as a “remedy” for the violation of the juror’s rights, and if the prosecutor 
failed to prove the error harmless, reversal to remedy the violation of the de-
fendant’s own rights.  That approach would retain the benefits of sentence re-
duction—providing an intermediate remedy that courts would be willing to in-
voke—but still allow reversal where trial fairness was compromised. 
C. Harmless but Serious Errors 
For most kinds of prosecutorial misconduct, most defendants receive no 
remedy at all because the violations, even if egregious, are deemed harmless.  
Sentence reduction could be adopted as a remedy for such “harmless but se-
rious” errors.  This approach would address several significant objections 
raised by critics of the harmless error doctrine. 
First, by eliminating the remedy for the great majority of violations, the 
harmless error doctrine seriously undermines deterrence.  As Judge Harry Ed-
wards puts it, “when evidence is not excluded, indictments are not quashed, 
and convictions are not overturned, we eviscerate the deterrent effect of these 
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and other similar measures. … After all, we can hardly expect prosecutors to 
respect the rights of criminal defendants whom they believe to be guilty when 
… judges are unwilling to do so.”244  Many scholars have agreed that the doc-
trine encourages prosecutorial misconduct.245   
A second criticism is that the doctrine ignores constitutional values other 
than “accuracy in the determination of guilt.”246 As Charles Ogletree argues, 
constitutional criminal procedure is designed “to restrain the government's hu-
man rights abuses . . . and sometimes to protect the human dignity of the ac-
cused.”247    But by only redressing errors that change the outcome of a trial, 
the Court “virtually tosses aside all other competing structural and constitu-
tional values.”248 Thus, the doctrine is problematic both from a corrective jus-
tice perspective—it leaves non-conviction-related harms unremedied—and 
from an expressive one: as Edwards says, it “infect[s] the entire criminal 
process with an ambivalence toward our most fundamental liberties.”249 
If mere words were enough to counter the expressive harms inflicted by 
procedural violations, then a finding that error has occurred but is harmless 
might be perfectly satisfactory to vindicate the “other constitutional values” to 
which Ogletree refers.  But as discussed in Part IV, words alone often “ring 
hollow” when unaccompanied by a remedy.250 Anderson and Pildes make an 
analogous argument about criminal punishment: 
Suppose a defendant convicted of a vicious crime is brought be-
fore a judge for sentencing.  The judge declares, ‘Your crime is 
horrific and wrong, and the State condemns you for it,’ and—
then releases the convict without punishment.  The outraged 
public would naturally think that the judge did not really mean 
what he said. . . . To condemn meaningfully requires not a mere 
utterance, even in the form of a stern lecture from the bench, 
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but a practice of punishment socially understood to express 
condemnation effectively.251  
Finally, the harmless error doctrine arguably impedes the development of 
legal doctrine.  Judge Edwards criticizes “judicial use of the harmless-error rule 
to avoid reaching a difficult issue in a case,” which “leaves unresolved the 
question of whether an error even occurred, thus offering no guidance to trial 
courts.”252 Many scholars likewise contend that courts’ ability to bypass the 
substantive issue results in doctrinal confusion or “law-freezing.”253  Avoid-
ance of constitutional questions is not always undesirable—it is traditionally 
required in some contexts.254  But this canon is typically invoked in the context 
of judicial review of legislation or non-litigation-related conduct.  Its concern 
with judicial overreaching seems inapplicable to appellate guidance to lower 
courts on procedural questions involving the conduct of the lawyers before 
them.  The Supreme Court has never cited constitutional avoidance to justify 
skipping to the harmless error question, and indeed has held that harmless error 
review “is triggered only after the reviewing court discovers that an error has 
been committed.”255  Surprisingly, however, many appellate courts have simply 
ignored this holding and continue to bypass the question of error.256 
Unfortunately, the cure that some scholars propose for these problems—
abolishing harmless error review entirely for constitutional errors, replacing it 
with automatic reversal257—may be worse than the disease. As discussed in 
Part I, automatic strong remedies for rights violations often discourage courts 
from finding violations in the first place.  The result may be “manipulation or 
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strained interpretation of substantive rules in order to justify affirmance.”258 As 
Stephen Saltzburg put it, “[i]f the subversion of federal rights is an object, state 
judges have a variety of means more effective for achieving that end.”259   
Indeed, weighed against the “law-freezing” objection is the possibility, 
raised by Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer, that harmless error may actually 
permit courts to adopt broader rights interpretations because it insulates them 
from excessively costly remedies.260   Replacing harmless error review with 
automatic reversal might thus retard rather than advance the progressive devel-
opment of rights that the doctrine’s critics desire.  Likewise, if courts systemat-
ically avoid finding violations, prosecutors are unlikely to be deterred from 
misconduct, and none of the defendant’s interests will be well served.   
Nor is tinkering with the harmless error standard, as some scholars sug-
gest,261 likely to solve these problems.  Harmless error standards have proven 
easy for courts to manipulate to achieve desired results—even the purportedly 
demanding Chapman test, which requires the prosecutor to prove constitutional 
violations harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.262 And to the extent that the 
new standard precluded courts from finding an error harmless, they might 
simply respond by not finding a violation.    
Finally, of course, even if (under any of the reform or elimination propos-
als) courts did end up finding violations and order reversal frequently, the re-
sulting proliferation of retrials would significantly undermine judicial efficien-
cy,263 which is the reason the harmless error doctrine exists in the first place.  
These costs may be disproportionate to the harm suffered by the defendant in 
cases in which procedural violations do not affect the verdict.   
A better alternative is to maintain harmless error review as to the question 
of whether the conviction should be reversed, but to allow or require a lesser 
remedy of sentence reduction when courts recognize a “serious but harmless” 
instance of prosecutorial misconduct—perhaps better referred to as “non-
conviction-related” rather than “harmless” errors, in light of the harm they do 
inflict. The seriousness threshold triggering the sentence reduction remedy 
could be set in any of a number of ways—for instance, it could turn on whether 
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the Constitution is violated, whether the misconduct was deliberate, or some 
combination of those factors.  
This approach is a satisfying solution to all of the above-discussed objec-
tions to the harmless error doctrine.  It could provide an effective deterrent to 
prosecutorial misconduct and a measure of compensation for the dignitary and 
other harms outside of guilt determination that defendants suffer.264  It serves 
an expressive purpose, recognizing that severe prosecutorial misconduct is not 
truly “harmless” even when it does not affect the outcome of the trial.265  And it 
avoids the “law-freezing” effect—courts presented with a request for sentence 
reduction could not skip the merits of a constitutional question on the basis of 
harmlessness—but without imposing the countervailing pressure against rights 
expansion that would come with the costly remedy of automatic reversal. 
VI. Practicalities 
Although this Article does not seek to work out all the details of a possible 
sentence reduction scheme, I offer here some initial thoughts on adoption and 
workability.  First, I consider possible legislative and judicial mechanisms for 
initial adoption, in light of various constitutional and statutory constraints. I 
then respond to a few practical objections concerning implementation. 
A. Legislative Approaches 
Sentence reduction could be prescribed as a remedy for prosecutorial 
misconduct by a legislature (or sentencing commission).  It could be built into 
determinate sentencing schemes, e.g., as a basis for a downward departure.  As 
discussed in Part IV, the magnitude of the departure could be left indeterminate 
or else specified.  In discretionary-sentencing jurisdictions, sentence reduction 
could still be required by statute as a remedy for particular kinds of miscon-
duct.  If there is an “advisory” sentencing scheme—like the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines after United States v. Booker266—remedial departure could either be 
required or recommended with whatever force the sentencing guidelines them-
selves hold.  Nothing in Booker or its predecessor Blakely v. Washington267 
precludes Congress or the states from specifying mandatory reductions to be 
adjudicated by a judge—only mandatory increases in sentencing exposure 
must be based on facts adjudicated by juries.268 
Legislatures or sentencing commissions are thus free to create a sen-
tence reduction remedy, but it would then be up to the relevant jurisdiction’s 
courts to determine whether the remedy is constitutionally sufficient.  Where 
the remedy exceeds what is presently treated as constitutionally required (as it 
would for “harmless” errors that presently receive no remedy), this would pre-
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sumably be no obstacle.269   Likewise, there would be no difficulty if the sole 
source of the underlying right were itself statutory—e.g., the jurisdiction’s 
rules of criminal procedure or evidence, or the Speedy Trial Act.  For such 
rights, the legislature is free to specify the remedy. 
Where the right is constitutional in nature and sentence reduction is less 
than the current usual remedy, however, defendants can be expected to litigate 
its constitutional sufficiency.  In the case of federal Speedy Trial Clause viola-
tions, as discussed in Part V.A, the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled the 
remedy insufficient, which would make federal legislation to the contrary al-
most surely futile.  But for corresponding state constitutional claims, the re-
medial question in many states may be open to litigation in state court. 
What about Batson claims?  Consider a hypothetical statute that orders 
automatic sentence reduction in cases of prosecutorial race discrimination in 
jury selection, but requires reversal only when the prosecution fails to prove 
that the verdict was unaffected.  That is, the statute would replace the present 
remedy of automatic reversal with automatic sentence reduction (plus reversal 
subject to harmless error review).   
The U.S. Supreme Court could and should approve such a remedial 
scheme.  While the Court has not undertaken harmless error review in Batson 
cases, it has never actually held that automatic reversal is constitutionally re-
quired.270  Moreover, under its doctrine, the Batson right is the juror’s, not the 
defendant’s; the reversal remedy exists to deter prosecutors from violating ju-
rors’ rights and to encourage defendants to bring violations to light.271  Sen-
tence reduction serves both those purposes better, in light of the remedial deter-
rence problem that plagues the current scheme. 
Legislatures cannot, of course, safely assume that their efforts to 
change constitutional remedies will survive judicial scrutiny.  There is some 
chance such legislation would be struck down.  As Bill Stuntz argued in 1997 
about possible legislative alteration of the Miranda warning requirement: 
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legislative overruling is extremely risky.  Courts could con-
clude that the [new remedy] is not an adequate replacement.  
And under current retroactivity doctrines, that would place at 
risk every criminal conviction in the trial and appellate pipe-
lines in which evidence obtained under the new regime had 
been used.272 
Stuntz’s warning was prescient.  The Supreme Court had never previously 
ruled that the Constitution actually required exclusion of evidence taken absent 
Miranda warnings, but it did so in 2000 in Dickerson v. United States, striking 
down an alternative admissibility rule that Congress had adopted.273  Its prickly 
admonition that “Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may 
not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress” signaled hostility to Con-
gress’s attempt to play on its turf.274  Risk-averse legislators might thus prefer 
to avoid substituting constitutional remedies for the Court’s stronger ones.   
That said, legislatively altering the remedy for prosecutorial miscon-
duct is much less risky than altering a rule governing admission of evidence, 
because such remedies are usually given on appeal.  A hypothetical Supreme 
Court case overturning an appellate remedy for prosecutorial misconduct 
would not require much relitigation of other cases, because cases still “in the 
trial or appellate pipelines”275 would not (yet) have been wrongly decided.  
Thus, the retroactivity concerns Stuntz raises would be far less applicable.  
Legislatures might reasonably choose to act even in the face of a substantial 
chance that the legislation would be struck down—especially if they conclude, 
as I do, that there is a fairly good chance that it wouldn’t be. 
B. Judicial Approaches 
Alternatively, courts could bypass the legislature and order sentence 
reductions themselves, where they have authority to do so. Such authority 
could be grounded in supervisory powers or in the federal or state constitution. 
  The U.S. Supreme Court has the supervisory authority “to prescribe 
rules of evidence and procedure that are binding” in federal courts,276 and state 
high courts enjoy similar prescriptive authority with respect to state courts.277  
But his authority is trumped by conflicting legislation or constitutional re-
quirements—it is a gap-filling authority.278 Notably, this means that the U.S. 
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Supreme Court cannot rely on it to order sentence reductions for “harmless” 
errors.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) requires courts to “disregard” 
errors that do not “affect substantial rights.”  The Supreme Court has held that 
this rule codifies the harmless error doctrine and that the Court has no supervi-
sory authority to displace it.279  For the Court to grant sentence reduction in a 
federal harmless error case, absent prior congressional authorization, it would 
have to hold that the remedy is constitutionally required.   
Supervisory authority might, however, allow state courts to order sen-
tence reduction for “harmless but serious” errors, depending on the wording of 
the state’s harmless error provisions.  All 50 states have such provisions in 
their statutes or constitutions.280  But they do not all include language, like that 
of Rule 52(a), requiring courts to “disregard” harmless errors entirely.  Instead, 
some simply prevent courts from reversing convictions.281  Such provisions 
seem to allow room for alternative remedies like sentence reduction.  If so, 
states almost certainly could apply such remedies to federal constitutional er-
rors occurring in state court as well as to errors of state law.282 
Second, courts also have the power to grant any remedies that are con-
stitutionally required, and this power naturally trumps conflicting legislation.  
Constitutionally required remedial rules ordered by the Supreme Court extend 
both to federal and state courts, and state courts may craft state constitutional 
remedial rules.  To the extent existing remedial rules are premised on this con-
stitutional authority, they can be changed by the relevant high courts.  
For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court could in its next Batson case hold 
that sentence reduction is a constitutionally adequate remedy.  Indeed, even a 
lower court would probably be free to so hold, because the Supreme Court has 
never squarely held that automatic reversal is constitutionally required. Like-
wise, sentence reduction could be ordered by state courts to remedy miscon-
duct violating the state constitution. 
One practical concern with judicial adoption of sentence reduction is 
whether it can be reconciled with existing sentencing legislation.  This question 
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has been the main source of controversy surrounding the permissibility of the 
remedy in Canada.283  If guidelines or mandatory minimums do not allow suf-
ficient discretion to permit remedial sentence reduction, they may preclude 
courts from relying on their supervisory authority to grant such reductions, be-
cause that authority depends on an absence of conflicting law.  Sentence reduc-
tions would then have to be premised on courts’ constitutional authority, or else 
authorized by the legislature.  But advisory guidelines, like the current federal 
system, almost surely do not present a problem.  While the weight accorded 
such guidelines remains unsettled, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
courts have broad authority to depart from them.284 
C. Implementation Concerns: Responses to Objections 
Regardless of which branch initially adopts a sentencing reduction 
scheme, its implementation raises some practical questions.  In Part IV, I ad-
dressed concerns related to commensurability and disparity in the magnitude of 
reductions; here, I respond to a few additional objections. 
The first is the possibility that courts would just raise the base sentence 
to cancel out the required reduction.285 This is unlikely to happen often.  First, 
in many jurisdictions, determinate sentencing schemes will make it difficult to 
manipulate the base sentence.286  Second, it is hard to see how an appeals court 
could engage in such manipulation, because the trial court’s sentence would 
presumably serve as the starting point for the reduction.  Third, most courts are 
unlikely to want to do so.  Studies show that most judges think sentences are 
too high,287 and moreover, many courts will presumably want to remedy se-
rious prosecutorial misconduct if they can do so without the massive windfall 
of complete release.288 Third, any court that would manipulate the base sen-
tence to avoid sentence reduction would surely engage in other kinds of mani-
pulation (like narrowing the right) to avoid current windfall remedies.   And 
finally, even if a court did engage in such manipulation, if it was well dis-
guised, the sentence reduction might still achieve its deterrent and expressive 
purposes. 
A variation on this concern is that prosecutors themselves will attempt 
to offset the impact of sentence reduction by exercising their discretion in ways 
that increase base sentences. This concern is more plausible, because prosecu-
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tors have a significant incentive to keep the sentence high.  Still, it is not so 
easy to see how this would work.  Most of prosecutors’ considerable power 
over sentences lies in their control over charging decisions and plea-
bargaining.289  But prosecutors tend already to exercise that control to maxim-
ize sentences, especially for defendants who choose to go to trial.290  Moreover, 
the kinds of misconduct I have discussed here generally take place well after 
the charging and plea stages, at or close to trial.  So a prosecutor will usually 
not be able to respond, after committing misconduct and getting caught, by 
ramping up the charges. She could make a higher-than-usual sentence recom-
mendation, but that would be fairly transparent and therefore likely less con-
vincing to the court.  She could start to charge more harshly in every case just 
in case she commits misconduct and gets caught.  But any prosecutor so Ma-
chiavellian as to plan in all cases for the likelihood of her own misconduct is 
probably already charging the maximum.291  Finally, even if she did find a way 
to compensate for the sentence reduction in a particular case, she wouldn’t be 
able to avoid the reputational cost of being publicly chastised by the appeals 
court, which may well be the most significant part of the sanction.   
A third variation is that legislatures or sentencing commissions will re-
spond by ramping up the base sentences.  Analogously, Bill Stuntz has argued 
that legislatures have historically responded to the expansion of constitutional 
criminal procedure by expanding the scope and penal severity of the substan-
tive criminal law.292 These concerns might provide a reason to prefer reforms 
conducted through the legislature itself, if possible.293  But in any event, it is 
not clear that sentence reductions would be likelier than current stronger reme-
dies to trigger this kind of political response. Stuntz does not suggest that harsh 
sentencing legislation is triggered by innovations in sentencing procedure spe-
cifically—rather, it responds to perceived “soft on crime” judging more gener-
ally.  If sentence reductions were less politically controversial than reversals or 
dismissals, then they might be less likely to provoke a legislative backlash.  
And there is some evidence that intermediate alternatives might be attractive to 
legislatures that dislike current all-or-nothing schemes.294  
                                                 
289 E.g., Standen, supra, at 1509. 
290 See supra Part III. 
291 Relatedly, Bill Stuntz argues that expanded procedural protections induce prosecutors to 
change whom they charge, dropping cases that have likely procedural claims in favor of 
those that don’t.  Stuntz, supra, at 4, 28. That argument largely pertains to police proce-
dure, however—charging practices are much less likely to be affected by improved reme-
dies for prosecutorial misconduct, given the timing of that misconduct. 
292 Stuntz, supra, at 7; William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 
119 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 784 (2006); accord William T. Pizzi, Punishment and Procedure, 
13 CONST. COMMENT. 55, 66-67 (1996). 
293 See Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note, at 796, 802-03 (noting that legislatures 
sometimes expand procedural protections themselves even though they resent judicially 
created protections).   
294 See HERMAN, supra, at 205-06 (noting that “what remedy to provide [in the Speedy Tri-
al Act] occasioned active debate in Congress because the choices—a severe remedy allow-
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  Another possible objection is that judicial resources could be strained if 
defendants start raising claims that would otherwise surely be declared harm-
less.  But Canada’s experience, so far, provides little basis for this concern, as 
in “the vast majority of cases, the offender only asked for a sentence reduction 
once a preferred remedy, such as exclusion of evidence or a stay of proceed-
ings, had been denied.”295  Thus, reduction requests are adjudicated at the sen-
tencing stage on the basis of submissions already made earlier in the proceed-
ings.296  Moreover, limiting the remedy to cases involving serious prosecutorial 
misconduct ought to discourage defense counsel from raising frivolous claims.  
Any lawyer who is willing to decline to raise harmless procedural errors will 
also probably decline to raise trivial ones.  And if serious misconduct has oc-
curred, then it would be a good thing if defense counsel had an incentive to 
bring it to courts’ attention. 
CONCLUSION 
Current remedies for prosecutorial misconduct are strikingly ineffec-
tive, largely because courts view them as too costly to grant.  Scholars too of-
ten have been unrealistic about this remedial deterrence problem, proposing 
stronger remedies for misconduct when the more realistic solution might be 
nominally “weaker” ones.  Adding sentence reduction to current all-or-nothing 
remedial schemes could help to deter and condemn prosecutorial misconduct, 
while avoiding the social costs of retrial and providing a fair measure of relief 
to defendants whose rights have been violated.  
This Article has sought to make the case for sentence reduction in 
terms of three distinct remedial purposes—deterrence, corrective justice, and 
expressive condemnation—that might strike some readers as being in tension.  
I have been deliberately agnostic as to the “proper” purpose of criminal proce-
dure remedies, for several reasons.  First, there may not always be one right 
answer—such remedies (like, for instance, civil damages297 or criminal pu-
nishment298) can and do simultaneously serve multiple purposes, or different 
purposes in different contexts.299  Second, because I believe sentence reduction 
can effectively serve all three goals, there is no real need to choose—the case 
for sentence reduction, I hope, is overdetermined.300   
                                                                                                                            
ing alleged criminals to escape punishment or a remedy with few if any teeth—were not 
inviting”). 
295 Bick, supra, at 230. 
296 Id. 
297 E.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) (holding that “the Bivens  remedy, in 
addition to compensating defendants, serves a deterrent purpose”). 
298 E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649 (citing “rehabilitation, deterrence, and 
retribution” as punishment purposes); Dan Kahan, What’s Really Wrong With Shaming 
Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2089-90 (2006) (discussing imprisonment’s purposes). 
299 E.g., Vasquez, 471 U.S. at 273 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing corrective and deterrent 
functions of reversal).   
300 Cf. Kahan, supra, at 2081-86 (arguing that social policies that are similarly overdeter-
mined are expressively more effective because of their broader cultural appeal). 
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That said, of course there would be cases, if my proposal were adopted, 
in which the various goals would support sentence reductions of quite different 
magnitudes.  Most notably, in cases involving serious prosecutorial misconduct 
that nonetheless caused the defendant little identifiable harm, it might be ne-
cessary to sacrifice the objective of corrective justice (by granting a remedy 
that “overcorrects”) in order to achieve effective deterrence or condemnation.  
Although I have offered a few thoughts on how to resolve such tensions, I have 
not proposed any firm rules for balancing competing interests or any formula 
for calculating the appropriate length of a reduction.  If my proposal were 
adopted, those details would be important subjects of further judicial, legisla-
tive, and scholarly debate. 
Significantly, adding the option of sentence reduction need not mean 
giving up on the advantages that current “stronger” remedies may sometimes 
offer.  Under my proposal, reversal would remain required when misconduct 
has compromised the reliability of the conviction, and dismissal with prejudice 
would be required when delays or other violations have rendered a fair trial 
impossible.  Moreover, even in cases not involving that kind of prejudice, these 
strong remedies could remain available as an option for the exceptional cases 
in which courts are willing to invoke them.   My proposal would eliminate the 
automatic remedies of reversal and dismissal for Batson and speedy trial cases, 
but permit those remedies on a discretionary basis.  For this reason, if reversal 
or dismissal is necessary for deterrent, expressive, or corrective purposes in 
some cases, sentence reduction need not displace it.  Rather, sentence reduction 
would target misconduct that exists in the very large zone between proper con-
duct and the extreme misconduct that currently triggers remedies. 
 In focusing on cases in which violations have not rendered a conviction 
unreliable, my proposal poses a challenge to current harmless error doctrine.  
When deciding what appellate remedy is due for violations of criminal defen-
dants’ procedural rights, courts today start by categorizing the violation in one 
of two boxes: those requiring some automatic remedy (e.g., Batson and speedy 
trial violations), or those requiring harmless error review (e.g., Brady violations 
and most forms of trial misconduct).  When considering cases in the first cate-
gory, courts face a windfall problem—because the remedy does not depend on 
the harm experienced by the defendant, it will often be greatly disproportionate 
to that harm, and the only way to avoid that imbalance is to avoid recognizing a 
violation at all.  When considering cases in the second category, courts face a 
different problem: they may respond only to one kind of harm (possible wrong-
ful conviction).  If that particular harm is absent, no remedy can be given, even 
if the violation caused other personal or social injuries or involved misconduct 
of a type that is often harmful and worth deterring. 
 My proposed approach is fundamentally different.  In the context of 
prosecutorial misconduct, it treats the cases in both categories the same way, 
without either presuming harm or narrowly cabining the kinds of harm courts 
can consider.  Instead, for all types of serious misconduct, appeals courts would 
ask more broadly what harm has resulted, and tailor their remedies accordingly.  
SENTENCE REDUCTION AS A REMEDY FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 57
If the harm includes a reasonable possibility of wrongful conviction, then re-
versal (or dismissal) is the proper remedy.  If not, the inquiry does not end, be-
cause the lesser remedy of sentence reduction may still be justified on correc-
tive, expressive, or deterrent grounds. 
 As the literature on remedial deterrence suggests, all-or-nothing reme-
dies also pose serious dilemmas for courts in contexts other than prosecutorial 
misconduct.  It may be worth rethinking the current remedial schemes in some 
of those contexts, and sentence reduction might be an alternative worth consi-
dering.  I do not mean to suggest, however, that automatic or all-or-nothing 
remedies have no place in criminal procedure.  For many kinds of rights viola-
tions, such remedies might be the best option, especially if alternatives like 
sentence reduction are not likely to be taken seriously by the wrongdoer.  In 
any event, I leave that project for another day.   
For now, I have focused on prosecutorial misconduct for two reasons.  
First, the sentence reduction remedy is one that prosecutors, especially, are 
likely to take seriously.  That gives it the prospect of being an effective deter-
rent, and also means that it is a meaningful condemnatory remedy—it can be 
understood by prosecutors themselves and by their communities as a punish-
ment for misconduct.  Second, there is now a quite longstanding scholarly con-
sensus that the current remedies for prosecutorial misconduct have failed.  If 
so, it is past time to think creatively about solutions. 
